Ami Mehta  
Effects of the Global Economic Recession (2007-12) on Models of Funding for the Contemporary Visual Arts in New York City and Madrid

Abstract

The majority of scholarship on cultural policy offers a cursory examination of the disparities between public funding for the arts in the United States and Europe. However, in light of the global economic recession (2007-12) and a drastic reduction in the budget of central governments, “traditional” models of public funding for the arts are adapting to remain apace with budgetary shortfalls. The current landscape of cultural policy is evolving as a result of economic and political shifts. Enduring severe austerity measures, Spain serves as an example of a nation that must modify its present framework on cultural policy in order to reduce the dependence of the arts on its Ministerio de Cultura. Similarly, the U.S. has also experienced a decline in the financial and administrative capacities of the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) and has reinforced the centrality of the private sector in supporting the arts. The essay traces the historical underpinnings of attitudes and values crucial in shaping the contemporary cultural policies of the U.S. and Spain, and then explores the structural transformation of cultural policy occurring in both nations today. Through the examination of legislation and official budgetary reports published by the NEA and the Ministerio de Cultura, the essay determined that both nations share a mutual stance on pressing the economic utility of the arts today. Moreover, the essay demonstrates the ways in which Spain is attempting to adopt a model of public funding for the arts similar to that of the U.S. in its emphasis on privatization of the arts. While the essay primarily focuses on the expression of cultural policy in the cities of Madrid and New York City, the implications resonate with Spain and the U.S. in a national context as well. The conclusion sheds light on the cultural policy challenges facing both Spain and the U.S., as developing nations are beginning to competitively construct their own forms of cultural policy.
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Chapter 1: The Evolution of Federal Government Support for the Arts in the United States

Given the abundance of cultural institutions in the United States today, one may be surprised to learn that the federal government long resisted public funding for the arts. In many ways, federal government support for the arts prior to 1965 can be described as indirect, inconsistent, and marginal (Mulcahy and Wyszomirski 122). In comparison to the United Kingdom or France, which respectively founded the British Arts Council in 1945 and appointed a Minister of Culture in 1959, the U.S. is a latecomer in forming a coherent cultural policy. An official federal government agency to support the arts did not exist in the U.S. until the creation of the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) in 1965. According to the NEA’s Appropriations History, as of 2012, the appropriation totals approximately $146,020,922 (Natl. Endowment for the Arts). The introduction of public funding for the arts in the U.S. is illuminated by an intricate and gradual narrative that evokes the founding and transformation of the nation.

The sharp leap in public funding for the arts demonstrates an evolution of cultural taste and demand in the U.S. Prominent scholars on cultural policy in the U.S., such as Kevin Mulcahy and Margaret Jane Wyszomirski, concede that the U.S. has generally displayed an ambiguous and contradictory attitude toward the arts (121). Two factors can account for the basis and spread of suspicion toward the arts in the U.S.: Protestantism and Republicanism.

Protestantism is frequently cited as the origin of several practices and attitudes that typify U.S. society, capitalism in particular. However, Protestantism also shaped the legacy of cultural policy in the U.S. by diffusing an attitude of distrust toward the arts. In “Reluctant Alliance: American Art, American Religion,” Neil Harris expounds on the threat of the arts to the Protestant settlers of New England. Harris clarifies that the arts, potent vehicles for the transmission of knowledge and the transformation of human experience, represented a theoretical
threat to the settlers rather than an actual threat (1). That theoretical threat stemmed from Protestant experience in the English Commonwealth, not the U.S., as Harris notes:

Few Americans of that day had ever encountered the work of noted painters, sculptors, and architects. But a legacy of suspicion—about great expense, luxury, and mercenary skills—had been passed on during the iconoclastic years of the English Commonwealth and has been perpetuated by both theological and political theorists ever since. (1)

Not only does Harris account for some Protestants’ skepticism about the role and value of the arts in the U.S., but also for the eventual seepage of the idea of this theoretical threat into the fabric of the federal government. To early Protestant settlers in the New World, the opulent pageantry and ritual of the British Commonwealth represented “the weakness of the human mind and its susceptibility to irrational persuasion” in government (Harris 1). However, it is rather odd that Protestants in New England harbored mistrust toward the arts whereas Protestants in Europe—in Switzerland, Scandinavia, and the German States—supported the arts as patrons of the academies of fine arts, opera, theater, and museums during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Harris, “Public Subsidies” 5). The striking disparity in public funding for the arts in the U.S. and Europe can also be linked to the political tradition of Republicanism that originated during the Revolutionary War of 1775 to 1783. Throughout the eighteenth century, American beliefs on Republicanism clashed with European values of Monarchism. Hostility toward the shameless concentration of political and commercial influence in Europe characterized the founding of the U.S. as a separate nation. Pomp, regalia, and sumptuous ceremony exemplified the intimate relationship between the Church and the State in Europe and incited radical opposition to the construction of castles, cathedrals, or other symbols of fortune and power in the
Republicanism is related to the founding era of the nation, under the leadership of Jefferson, Madison, and Jackson, and espouses the creation of a government that is limited in its scope and breach, heeds the danger of corruption, and opposes displays of pageantry and ceremony. The Constitution fastidiously adhered to the tenets of Republicanism and safeguarded the nation against the threat of dominating institutions. During the eighteenth century, Americans began to label the U.S. “The Great Republic” as the nation strove to be free of the conspicuous consumption that characterized Europe (Harris, “Public Subsidies” 5).

The first mention of the arts in American legislation lies in the 1787 U.S. Constitution. Section 8 of Article I enumerates the functions of the Congress, and one responsibility is to “promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries” (The U.S. Natl. Archives and Records Administration). The first clause established a critical precedent that paved the path for the creation of the Library of Congress in 1800 and the Smithsonian Institution in 1846. However, it is important to note that the underlying purpose for their creation is unrelated to promoting the arts. The second part of the quoted passage is significant in setting a precedent for the Copyright Act of 1790, an act that would have crucial consequences for the arts from the nineteenth century onward to the present day.

Before the Civil War of 1861, federally supported cultural institutions did not exist in the U.S., although the Library of Congress and the Smithsonian Institution serve as exceptions. The Library of Congress functioned as a reference library for Congress and contained “such books as may be necessary for the use of Congress, and for putting up a suitable apartment for containing them therein” (The Library of Congress). The founding of the Smithsonian Institution is also
characterized by a stroke of luck. In 1846, President James K. Polk established the Smithsonian Institution as a trust to be administered by a Board of Regents and a Secretary of the Smithsonian (The Smithsonian Institution). The Smithsonian Institution is often heralded as a “national” cultural institution, but in reality, James Smithson, a scientist from Great Britain, invented the proposal and provided the funding to create “an establishment for the increase and diffusion of knowledge” (The Smithsonian Institution). Smithson visited the U.S. and became impressed by the nation’s seemingly successful experiment with democracy; he therefore decided to create the Smithsonian Institution in the U.S. as opposed to Great Britain. Smithson included instructions on founding the Smithsonian Institution in his Last Will and Testament of 1826, and the U.S. took approximately twenty years to carry out the request (The Smithsonian Institution Archives).

The tale indicates the disparity in attitudes toward the arts in the U.S. and Great Britain during the first half of the nineteenth century—the latter more receptive to the arts than the former. The Library of Congress and the Smithsonian Institution may have been among the first cultural institutions to be inaugurated in the U.S., however the founding of both can be described as chance occurrences or flukes (Harris, “Public Subsidies” 5).

In Europe, the nineteenth century presents a different version of events. In contrast to the U.S., nations and nation-states including Spain, France, Austria, Great Britain, and the States of Germany engaged in ambitious projects of collecting art and antiquities throughout the world and creating extravagant museums, theaters, and operas to display acquired treasures and, in certain cases, “loot.”¹ The nineteenth century marked the rise of nationalism in Western Europe. In Nationalism in Europe: 1815 to the Present, Stuart Woolf points to a nascent patriotism in these new states:

¹ For a compelling account on the stolen treasures of the Ancient World in the Musée du Louvre, the Metropolitan Museum of Art, and the British Museum see Waxman 62-87, 175-233.
A national patriotism developed within the “political nation” of the ruling elites as an important coagulating element in the construction of the early-modern dynastic state. It was a patriotism which was expressed most vocally against the threat of other states and which was articulated through a panoply of “national” institutions. (8)

The nations and nation-states applied the “threat of other states” to the arts as well, and the “panoply of “national” institutions” included the cultural institutions that emerged during the nineteenth century. The cultural institutions constituted a form of national identity to bolster the political claim of nationalism (Woolf 8). During the latter half of the eighteenth century and the start of the nineteenth century, a number of cultural institutions surfaced in Western Europe, the 1759 British Museum in London, the 1793 Musée du Louvre in Paris, the 1819 Museo del Prado in Madrid, the 1823-30 Altes Museum in Berlin, and the 1872-91 Kunsthistorisches Museum in Vienna among others.

On the other hand, American cultural institutions did not mirror the magnitude of cultural institutions in Europe. Furthermore, cultural institutions in the U.S. remained local, primarily located in cities on the East Coast, and amassed support from private funding (Harris, “Public Subsidies” 5). One such example is the American Academy of Fine Arts, founded in New York City in 1802, to encourage the arts in the U.S. and to provide exhibition space and the opportunity to study the arts (Lett et al. 20). The American Academy of Fine Arts shortly came to an end in 1833 due to a lack of interest from stockholders and the public (Lett et al. 21). In 1838, the Apollo Association formed to support the failing Apollo Gallery, run by James Herring, in New York. The Apollo Association, termed the American Art-Union in 1844, used subscription revenue, approximately five dollars a year per subscriber, to mount exhibitions and
to encourage patrons to visit the gallery (Lett et al. 21). In return, the subscriber also received an engraving, a lottery entry for a painting, and a free subscription to the American Art-Union Bulletin (Adams 8).

The American Art-Union, and Herring in particular, based the organization on the Edinburgh Association for the Promotion of Fine Arts in Scotland and similar art-unions in Europe during the 1820s and 1830s (Adams 9). At the time, the American Art-Union represented the most powerful art-union in the U.S. As the nation drifted closer to the Civil War of 1861, the American Art-Union attempted to unite the nation by cultivating an audience and appreciation for American art and offering free admission to the gallery, a strategy used to appeal to the expanding middle class (Lett et al. 21-23). The only other organization to mount exhibitions in New York City, aside from a small number of commercial shops selling paintings, was the National Academy of Design. However, like the unsuccessful Apollo Gallery, the National Academy of Design encountered difficulty in selling its collection of paintings, which the American Art-Union purchased in 1850 (Adams 15). As successful as the American Art-Union appeared, it was the subject of sectionalism and criticism from bitter artists outside of the art-union (Lett et al. 18). In 1852, the New York Supreme Court ruled that the American Art-Union constituted an illegal lottery, and the organization shutdown soon after (Lett et al. 122). As the American Academy of Fine Arts, the Apollo Gallery, the Apollo Association, and the American Art-Union demonstrate, the majority of cultural institutions in the U.S. before 1861 failed. The failure of such entrepreneurial ventures for the arts in the U.S., and the success of similar art-unions in Europe, points to the nations’ disparity in the cultural taste and demand for the visual arts.
It is paradoxical that although the New York Supreme Court effectively terminated the American Art-Union in 1852, the federal government did support the arts during the nineteenth century. However, the federal government justified support for the arts through the pretense that the arts and artists must “serve better causes—those of morality and freedom” (Harris, “Public Subsidies” 6). During the first half of the nineteenth century, federal government support for the arts precluded the notion of \textit{l’art pour l’art} and was justified by measuring the arts’ utility to the nation. In many ways, serving the interests of the nation implied advancing the goal of democracy. As a logical extension of this idea, the federal government exercised authority over the artists whom it hired to embellish federal buildings. The commissions reflect a grandiose vision of the U.S.; a relevant example is the \textit{Declaration of Independence} by John Trumball (Fig. 1). The federal government also hired Trumball to paint a series of paintings on the Revolutionary War of 1775 to 1783 to decorate the Capitol Building in Washington D.C., rebuilt in 1817 following the War of 1812.
The Declaration of Independence was the first commission for a painting by the federal government, and it is an instructive example that highlights the patriotic nature of initial federal government support for the arts. The bulk of federal government commissions consisted of paintings and statues of military heroes. Aside from federal government commissions designated for Washington D.C., other commissions for paintings and statues of military heroes remained the responsibility of affluent citizens (Harris, “Public Subsidies” 6).

The Civil War of 1861 marked a turning point in the evolution of cultural policy in the U.S. In its aftermath, citizens embarked on a campaign to dignify the nation through reconstruction efforts. The “absence of visible government” during the 1860s led to a collapse in national unity and patriotism, but following the Civil War, the nation experienced an expansion in federal government buildings (Harris, “Public Subsidies” 6). The emergence of elaborate courthouses, libraries, monuments, arches, and fountains both dignified the function of the
federal government and provided employment to artists. The unexpected lack of disagreement over the ambitious reconstruction efforts funded by the federal government reflects the shift in attitudes toward federal government support for the arts.

During the 1870s and 1880s, the nation also witnessed the emergence of several monumental cultural institutions, including the Metropolitan Museum of Art in 1870, the Boston Museum of Fine Arts in 1876, the Art Institute of Chicago in 1879, and the Boston Symphony Orchestra in 1881. However, the creation of large-scale cultural institutions points to a trend that differs from reconstruction and dignifying the nation in its emphasis on social and economic class and geography. On the one hand, the founding of such institutions rested upon philanthropy and the interests of civic-minded and affluent citizens. On the other hand, the government provided varying amounts of funding and indirect subsidies through the provision of land grants and building maintenance.

The initiative to create the first wave of cultural institutions in the U.S. stemmed from the desires of civic-minded and affluent citizens—citizens who yearned to import and appropriate the culture of Europe in flourishing U.S. cities. In Europe, the governments of Germany, Austria, and Hungary, among others, sponsored the creation of trade schools for artisans working with glass, silver, textile, wood, and metal. The artisans produced exquisite luxury goods such as furniture, silverware, carpets, and ironwork that enticed consumers in the U.S., creating a favorable balance of trade for Europe (Harris, “Art and the Public Purse”). Many influential citizens of the U.S. traveled to Europe to be mesmerized by its architecture, sculpture, and painting and to purchase artisanal luxury goods to decorate lavish interiors. The apparent penchant for Europe, and its impact on the balance of trade, incited civic-minded and affluent citizens to create cultural institutions in the U.S. to rival those of Europe. The founders aimed to
present the U.S. as equally refined and educated as its cross-continental counterparts. For example, the genesis of the Metropolitan Museum of Art can be traced to Paris in 1866, where inspired by the Musée du Louvre, a “group of Americans agreed to create a “national institution and gallery of art” to bring art and art education to the American people” (The Metropolitan Museum of Art). However, the Metropolitan Museum of Art, as well as the Boston Museum of Fine Arts and the Art Institute of Chicago, also included departments devoted to the industrial arts—the U.S. “answer” to the trade schools of Europe. The departments provided instruction in painting, drawing, and designing and reflected the concerns of its founders—“that unless American workers and consumers improved their knowledge and skill base, it would be difficult to defend American products against luxury exports from abroad, and even more difficult to export them” (Harris, “Art and the Public Purse”). The economic undertone of the founders’ argument, as well as the intermingling of the upper class in politics persuaded the federal government to offer indirect subsidies in the forms of land grants and building maintenance.

The fact that influential and affluent citizens founded the first wave of cultural institutions in the U.S. carried with it an assumption that responsibility for the arts belonged to the upper class. In reality, cultural institutions principally catered to the interest of their founders, not to that of the public. The upper class shouldered the task of creating cultural institutions in the U.S. and thereby limited access as well. The Beaux-Arts façade of the Metropolitan Museum of Art was completed in 1902, and its scale and grandeur illustrate the intimidating and exclusive nature of cultural institutions of the day (Fig. 2) (The Metropolitan Museum of Art). Other cultural institutions also adopted the Beaux-Arts architecture, such as the Art Institute of Chicago and the Detroit Institute of Arts. In sum, the arts gradually became regarded as the hobby and privilege of the upper class.
The first wave of cultural institutions to surface in the U.S. demonstrates the attempt of cities such as New York, Boston, and Chicago to become world-class cities (Stewart 105-6). The impulse to be designated as a world-class destination stemmed not only from the appeal of tourism revenue or the goal to outperform Europe, but also from the popularity and proliferation of world expositions during the latter half of the nineteenth century. In many ways, world expositions prompted the federal government to increase its expenditure of public funds for the arts.

The Centennial Exposition of 1876 encouraged the federal government to use public funds for the assembly of extraordinary fairgrounds and facilities. Although construction for world exposition fairgrounds was often temporary and plaster-based, the Memorial Hall of the Centennial Exposition housed an art gallery and later became chartered as the Philadelphia Museum of Art (Fig. 3) (Centennial Photographic Co.). The Centennial Exposition attempted to mirror the cultural institutions of London:
Philadelphians recognized that the Centennial Exposition was a unique opportunity to form a nucleus of objects that could, in time, grow and benefit the city’s industries. So together, representatives of the city’s leading educational institutions, as well as state and city authorities, actively pursued this goal—envisioning the creation of a museum along the lines of the recently completed South Kensington Museum in London. (The Philadelphia Museum of Art)

The desire to imitate Europe is a recurring theme in the development of cultural institutions in the U.S., as is the practical interest of the federal government in supporting the arts if and only they prove beneficial to industry.


The Centennial Exposition also prompted the launch of the nearby Boston Museum of Fine Arts in 1876. During the Columbian Exposition of 1893 in Chicago, the city partly sponsored the relocation of the Art Institute of Chicago to its present site on Michigan Avenue (The Art Institute of Chicago). The facts above reveal the manner in which federal, state, and municipal governments collaborated to allot public funds to the arts as a means to announce and
advertise U.S. cities to the world (Stewart 106-7). However, rather than fostering a genuine and permanent discourse on the relationship between the federal government and the arts, the allotments focused on the rapid and temporary acquisition of art for publicity purposes.

The second wave of cultural institutions to emerge in the U.S. dotted the landscapes of the Midwest and the West Coast. The confluence of post-war civic pride and the growth of industry compelled cities such as Saint Louis, Detroit, Toledo, and Portland to create a set of cultural institutions intended to match those of the East Coast—the Saint Louis Art Museum in 1879, the Portland Art Museum in 1892, the Detroit Institute of Arts in 1885, and the Toledo Museum of Art in 1901 (Stewart 106-7). The east to westward expansion of cultural institutions resulted in long-term implications that affect public funding for the arts today. As the birthplace of cultural institutions in the U.S., the East Coast has maintained a tight grip on the arts and continues to receive the greatest amount of public funding (Zeigler 67-8).

The decade of the 1910s represents an important milestone in the formation of a cultural policy in the U.S. In 1910, President William Howard Taft established the Commission of Fine Arts to advise the President and Congress on the design of the national capital and symbolic or commemorative works such as U.S. coins, medals, and military cemeteries (Stewart 107). The title of the Commission of Fine Arts is misleading, as it suggests that it functions in a manner similar to a Ministry of Culture by supporting the arts and artists of the nation in a far-reaching capacity. In reality, the Commission of Fine Arts continued the tradition of federal government support for the arts and artists by catering to the interest of the nation. The true hallmark of the 1910s is the Revenue Act of 1917; it established a deduction for individual charity contributions, up to fifteen percent of one’s annual income. In many ways, the Revenue Act of 1917 is the foundation of arts policy in the U.S. The Revenue Act of 1917 laid the groundwork for
contributions to the arts through individuals, foundations, and corporations, approximately forty-three percent of total support for the non-profit arts today (Cherbo, Vogel, and Wyszomirski 19).

The Revenue Act of 1917 ushered in an era of great philanthropy for the arts during the 1920s. The rise of foundations and corporations, notably the Guggenheim Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Carnegie Corporation, provided considerable support to the arts and artists and, in a certain respect, filled in for the absence of a federal government agency for the arts. During the latter half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, several industrialists, such as Andrew Carnegie, Henry Clay Frick, John D. Rockefeller, and J.P. Morgan, accumulated fortunes in the steel, oil, and finance industries (Voth 26). At the time, the term “robber barons” surfaced to describe the dubious or perhaps illegal methods used by the industrialists to amass fortunes. However, the industrialists also sought to address the social and economic issues that plagued the U.S., and donated large sums to alleviate poverty, encourage literacy, and educate the populace (Voth 26). In *The Gospel of Wealth*, Andrew Carnegie articulated a philosophy for philanthropy in which the surplus of the industrialists ought to be allocated and administered by them, as trustees, during their lifetimes (230). Carnegie and other industrialists agreed that the federal government, due to its incompetence and corruption, ought to be excluded from intervening in the social and economic issues of the day and that the industrialists ought to shoulder the responsibility instead (Voth 26-7). In regard to philanthropy for the arts, Carnegie proposed, “As with libraries and museums, so with these more distinctively artistic works: they perform their great use when they reach the best of the masses of the people” (240). Carnegie feared that philanthropy for the arts might be perceived as “fanciful,” and therefore opted to create cultural institutions that could be accessible to the masses (240). In 1924, the Rockefeller Foundation also embraced the arts as a field for philanthropy as Edwin R.
Embree, Foundation Secretary, stated, “Some emphasis upon the arts and humanities might be a good balance for the other features of our program which so exclusively concern science and health. What is the good to keep people alive and healthy if their lives are not touched increasingly with something of beauty?” (The Rockefeller Foundation). The Guggenheim Foundation, founded by Solomon R. Guggenheim, directly supported artists by purchasing the paintings of Vasily Kandinsky, Paul Klee, and Marc Chagall and mounting exhibitions for the public during the 1930s (The Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation). The rise of foundations and corporations fundamentally altered the course of cultural policy in the U.S. by reinforcing the role of the private sector in funding for the arts.

During the onset of the Great Depression during the 1930s, the 1920s philanthropy of foundations and corporations could no longer compensate for the role of the federal government in addressing social and economic issues. The Wall Street Crash of 1929 triggered a decrease in the number of patrons for the arts and, consequently many artists faced unemployment (Harrison 290). Following the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932 and the start of the New Deal shortly after, the federal government functioned as a pseudo-patron for the arts and added artists onto work-relief rolls for the first time. The New Deal programs that supported the arts and artists are extensive in detail and scope and are a subject for another essay. However, in summary, the programs included the Public Works of Art Project (PWAP; 1933-34), the Treasury Section of Painting and Sculpture (The Section; 1934-43), the Temporary Relief Art Project (TRAP; 1935-39), and the Federal Art Project (FAP; 1935-43) (Harrison 290-92). The major consequence of the New Deal for artists came in the form of employment, as Helen A. Harrison notes, “Now, for the first time in American history, they were equated by their government with other skilled workers and could take pride in the practice of their profession.
without the degrading necessity of living on public charity” (290). The PWAP and FAP, for example, provided employment to artists on the work-relief rolls by encouraging the use of local artists to decorate post offices, libraries, and hospitals. Although the PWAP ended after a brief six-month period, it had employed nearly four thousand artists and produced fifteen and a half thousand works of art (Harrison 290). In New York City alone, the FAP employed over two and a half thousand artists in 1936 (Harrison 292). In addition to employment, the Section and the FAP also circulated exhibitions, established a gallery in New York City, sponsored research projects on the arts, built community art centers, and provided teachers for the arts (Harrison 291-93). In many ways, the New Deal attempted to integrate arts and the artist into the community. It can be argued that, aside from criticism by artists who felt pressured to create art in a federal government specified style or the “American Scene,” the national unity fostered by the Great Depression yielded few complaints over the New Deal programs for the arts during the first half of the 1930s.

The brevity of the New Deal programs highlights the forthcoming hostility toward the arts and the artist during the 1940s and 1950s. By 1938, Congress suspected members of the FAP to be advocates of Communism, and the number of unemployed artists increased. As Harrison puts it in “American Art and the New Deal,” “Social conscience was equated with radicalism, and in 1939 Congress refused to continue to support the Art Program” (295). In many ways, depictions of social change by artists during the Great Depression led to accusations of Communist affiliation in the PWAP, the Section, the TRAP, and the FAP. The accusations translated into the anti-Communism witch hunt of the McCarthy Era during the 1940s and 1950s; the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) and its brutal discrimination against artists and filmmakers serves as the most notorious example. On the other hand, following World
War II, the federal government enlisted the arts, and in particular Abstract Expressionism, as a weapon of ideology during the Cold War (Cockcroft 128). Although Abstract Expressionism did not evoke any particular political ideology or any trace of patriotism, the U.S. touted it as representative of the ideals of the nation—freedom and democracy—at the Venice Biennale. The existence of a U.S. and Soviet Union pavilion at the Venice Biennale from 1948 to 1956 reinforces the idea that the arts can be used to contest conflicting political ideologies. In reality, federal government support for Abstract Expressionism during the Cold War resembled propaganda more than a form of cultural policy.

In 1961, the election of President John F. Kennedy constituted a milestone not only for the nation, but also for the arts. John F. Kennedy embraced the arts in a visible manner. First, John F. Kennedy invited both Mark Rothko and Franz Kline to attend the inauguration (Breslin 4). Second, First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy campaigned for and lobbied the French Cultural Minister, André Malraux, to debut Leonardo da Vinci’s *Mona Lisa* at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City and the National Gallery in Washington D.C. for fifty-two days in 1962 (Fig. 4).² John F. Kennedy and Jacqueline Kennedy inspired the nation to appreciate the arts and encouraged the federal government to adopt a coherent form of cultural policy. On October 26, 1963, John F. Kennedy delivered a speech at Amherst College in Massachusetts to honor the life of the poet Robert Frost. Kennedy conveyed the importance of the role of the artist in nourishing democracy and strengthening the nation as he stated:

I see little of more importance to the future of our country and our civilization than full recognition of the place of the artist. I look forward to an America which will reward achievement in the arts as we reward achievement in business or

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² See Davis for a documentary account on First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy’s masterminding of the exhibition.
statecraft. I look forward to an America which will steadily raise the standards of artistic accomplishment and which will steadily enlarge cultural opportunities for all of our citizens. (Natl. Endowment for the Arts, “President John F. Kennedy”)

President Lyndon B. Johnson carried out the vision of Kennedy following his assassination on November 22, 1963 by signing into legislation the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities, creating the NEA in 1965. The NEA will be discussed in detail in the following chapter outlining the infrastructure of the federal, regional, state, and municipal organizations that currently support the arts in the U.S.

Chapter 2: The National Endowment for the Arts

As discussed in Chapter One, federal government support for the arts in the U.S. did not exist until the creation of the NEA in 1965. The first appropriation for the NEA, in 1966, constituted approximately $2,898,308, and the following year the amount quadrupled to nearly $8,457,692 (Natl. Endowment for the Arts). The dramatic increase in the appropriation of the NEA within the first year of its existence as a federal government agency reflects a desire on the part of the U.S. to form a coherent cultural policy—similar yet not identical to the ministries of culture of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Spain among others. However, the structure and scope of cultural policy in the U.S. fundamentally differed from those of Europe.

The federal government envisioned a system of public funding for the arts that did not dictate the terms and conditions of culture. In other words, the founding of the NEA did not correspond to the introduction of a conformist cultural agenda (Natl. Endowment for the Arts, “How the United States”). The NEA is the primary federal government agency for support of the arts in the U.S., yet it does not exhibit a top-down approach to public funding; rather it has cultivated a distributary approach through an interconnected and complex amalgam of state, regional, and local government agencies. Other federal government agencies that provide support to the arts and culture include (Fig. 5):
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Federal Government Agency</th>
<th>2012 Appropriation for the Arts and Culture (Millions)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Smithsonian Institution</td>
<td>$812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporation for Public Broadcasting</td>
<td>$444</td>
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<td>Institute of Museum and Library Services</td>
<td>$232</td>
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<td>National Endowment for the Humanities</td>
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<td>National Gallery of Art</td>
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<td>Department of Education</td>
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<td>Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts</td>
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<td>Presidio Trust</td>
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<tr>
<td>Institute of American Indian and Alaska Native American Culture and Arts Development</td>
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<td>Advisory Council on Historic Preservation</td>
<td>$6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commission of Fine Arts</td>
<td>$2</td>
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While it appears that the arts and culture receive considerable subsidies from other federal government agencies, financial support is restricted to promote a strategic goal that concerns its mission—not all federal government agencies offer direct support to the arts and culture (Natl. Endowment for the Arts, “How the United States”). Moreover, all of the federal government agencies listed in Fig. 5 function in the interest of national patrimony and are reluctant to fund activities that may appear controversial to public interest (Natl. Endowment for the Arts, “How the United States”).

The structure of public funding for the arts in the U.S. is characterized by decentralization, diversity, and dynamism. The U.S. has developed a distinct manner of supporting the arts, frequently referred to by arts and cultural policy scholars as the “arms-length paradigm” (Cherbo, Vogel, and Wyszomirsky 18). The defining feature of the arms-length paradigm includes a modest amount of direct financial support and a substantial amount of indirect financial support and benefits. The latter stems from an elaborate system of tax

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subsidies; in general, non-profit arts organizations are often exempt from income and property taxes, and private contributions are largely tax deductible for sponsors.

The greatest hallmark of the U.S. system of funding for the arts is the privatization of the arts and culture. Pioneered by industrialists-cum-philanthropists at the turn of the twentieth century, private support for the arts accounts for nearly 43% of total support for the non-profit arts today (Cherbo, Vogel, and Wyszomirsky 19). Private support for the arts includes donations by individuals, foundations, and corporations—tax subsidies are instrumental in leveraging private support for the arts. In short, the U.S. system of funding for the arts encompasses a unique hybrid of public and private support.

The arts and cultural projects of the Works Progress Administration (WPA) during the 1930s, and the subsequent political controversies of the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) during the Cold War, served as the backdrop to the creation of the NEA in 1965 by exemplifying the benefits and dangers of a federal government agency to support the arts (Mulcahy and Wyszomirski 122). However, two events accelerated the momentum to create a federal government agency for the arts. First, President Johnson sought to evoke the aura of youthfulness and sophistication, characteristic of President Kennedy, by appointing Roger L. Stevens as the first full time presidential advisor on the arts (Bauerlein and Grantham 13). Second, in 1965 the Rockefeller Brothers Fund issued a report titled The Performing Arts: Problems and Prospects that confirmed that federal government support is essential to the continuity of the arts in the U.S. (Bauerlein and Grantham 15). Due to the backdrop of the catastrophe and destruction of the Cold War and ensuing Vietnam War, the creation of the NEA signaled a renewed focus on the notions of civilization and humanity. Several Senators, notably Claiborne Pell, Hubert Humphrey, and Jacob Javits, cast the creation of the NEA as an uplifting
and enriching initiative against the turbulent and dispiriting political climate (Bauerlein and Grantham 13-14).

On September 29, 1965 President Johnson signed the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act, establishing the NEA and the NEH. *The Declaration of Purpose* of the NEA is critical to understanding the function and scope of the NEA today, primarily in its emphasis on the enlarged role of private support for the arts in the U.S.:

> The encouragement and support of national progress and scholarship in the humanities and the arts, while primarily a matter for private and local initiative, is also an appropriate matter of concern to the Federal Government. (Mulcahy and Wyszomirski 121)

*The Declaration of Purpose* serves to justify the intervention of the federal government in the otherwise autonomous sphere of the arts. For the first time, we see that the federal government was attempting to sanction and regulate support for the arts, although the measure was largely intended to bolster private support.

The NEA awarded its first grant, in the sum of $100,000, to the American Ballet Theatre in 1965 (Natl. Endowment for the Arts, “Highlights”). In the visual arts, whether the NEA initially aligned itself with critical and contemporary trends is a topic of debate among arts and cultural policy scholars. The NEA maintains that it rewarded risk taking and innovation in the visual arts, as evidenced by the 1967 roster of NEA grantees including Donald Judd, Mark Di Suvero, Tony Smith, Dan Flavin, and Manuel Neri among other non-traditionalists (Fig. 6) (Bauerlein and Grantham 22). On the other hand, Donna M. Binkiewicz suggests that the NEA, between 1967 and 1975, favored awarding grants to artists that engaged in the “tried-and-true” yet celebrated traditions of Abstract Expressionism, Color-Field Painting, Minimalism, and
Monumental Sculpture (“Federalizing the Muse” 138). Binkiewickz contends that the NEA adhered to the tenets of the Cold War—supporting those artists who championed the ideals of freedom, democracy, and diplomacy (“Federalizing the Muse” 138). Quantitatively, Binkiewickz concludes that in 1967, of the sixty $5,000 grants for individual painters and sculptors in the visual arts, over 67% of grantees could be categorized under the genre of Abstraction (184). In effect, the NEA largely ignored rewarding innovation in experimental and novel genres of art during the 1960s and 1970s, such as Post-Minimalism, Feminist, Black, or Ethnic Arts (Binkiewickz 184). On another note, Binkiewickz argues that the NEA disproportionately awarded grants to artists residing on the East or West Coasts. For example, in 1969, 95% of grantees resided in New York alone (184). The maldistribution of grants was due, in part, to the high concentration of artists in the East and West Coasts and the initial tendency of the NEA to offer grants to mid- or late-career artists—chiefly well-known artists who, if from the South or Midwest, had likely relocated to the East or West Coasts (“Federalizing the Muse” 139). The regional distribution of grants shifted by the 1970s as the focus of the NEA shifted from artistic excellence to access.

It is important to note that by 1967 the NEA had not yet developed a mechanism or process for grant applications—the grantees mentioned in the previous passage had been selected on the basis of nominations solicited by the NEA from leading institutions and individuals in the arts (Bauerlein and Grantham 22). However, by 1970, the NEA had acquired a formal hierarchy of authority, a specialized administrative style, and a model to support the arts in a limited and collaborative manner (Mulcahy and Wyszomirsky 123).

As Mulcahy and Wyszomirsky observe, the organization structure of the NEA is “short and flexible as well as augmented by an extensive advisory network” (128). The President of the U.S. appoints a Chairperson for a four-year term, and the Chairperson is ultimately responsible for final grant decisions. The formal organization structure of the NEA is illustrated in Fig. 7.3

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3 The Acting Chairperson of the NEA is currently Joan Shigekawa.
In contrast to the informal process characterized by 1967, the NEA established a formal Peer Review/Panel System that it continues to use today. The panels are each composed of a group of experts in the arts, as well as individuals from other fields of expertise and one layperson with a broad understanding of the discipline under review—membership changes regularly. The panels are organized around a particular discipline (Fig. 8). The recommendations of the panels are forwarded to the National Council on the Arts—consisting of 18 established artists, arts administrators, scholars, and arts patrons appointed by the President and confirmed by the U.S. Senate. In addition, six members of Congress also serve on the council for two-year terms and in a non-voting capacity, while the other members serve six-year terms. In general, the council meets three times a year to review panel recommendations, and the Chairman ultimately makes the final decision on all grants (Natl. Endowment for the Arts, “How the United States”).

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The NEA adheres to four categories in the allocation of grants: art that meets the highest standards of excellence, public engagement with diverse and excellent art, lifelong learning in the arts, and strengthening communities through the arts. In addition, the NEA awards grants for the commissioning and development of new work, the presentation of performances and exhibitions, arts education projects, the preservation of artworks, and innovative use of models and technology to create artwork or engage audiences. In general, the grants range from $10,000 to $100,000 (Natl. Endowment for the Arts, “How the United States”).

The types of funding offered by the NEA have varied throughout the decades. At present, the NEA awards grants through Grants for Arts Projects, which are divided into two subcategories: Art Works and Challenge America Fast-Track (Natl. Endowment for the Arts, “How the United States”). “Art Works” is defined as a noun, verb, and declarative sentence—as the creation of artists, as the ability of art to inspire and to enact change, and as an economic statement that “art jobs are real jobs that are part of the real economy” (Natl. Endowment for the Arts, “Performance and Accountability”). The aim of Challenge America Fast-Track is to expand the scope of the arts to populations traditionally underserved by the arts due to limitations related to geography, ethnicity, economy, and disability (Natl. Endowment for the Arts, “Appropriations Request”). Challenge America Fast-Track primarily allocates grants to support local festivals, exhibits, performances, public murals and sculptures, environmental art, and cultural tourism (Natl. Endowment for the Arts, “Appropriations Request”).

Both Art Works and Challenge America Fast-Track reflect a significant shift in the priorities of the NEA. In light of the global economic recession and constraining measures by Congress to reduce discretionary spending, the NEA has realigned its vision and mission to demonstrate the practicality of the arts to the public as well as the efficacy of the arts in
addressing wide ranging economic, political, and social matters. From the final of the tri-fold definition of Art Works, one can gauge that the NEA is intently focused on reaffirming the economic value and impact of the arts in the U.S. In many ways, the NEA is mirroring an effort led by arts and cultural policy scholars to designate the arts as a sector—“an essential engine of economic and social development and integral to community and personal satisfaction in the emerging global knowledge-based economy” (Cherbo, Vogel, and Wyszomirski 9). In other words, the NEA is attempting to situate itself in the ongoing global dialogue concerning creative economy, creative cities, and creative industries as a means to amass broad support from other sectors. In order to advance the economic value and impact of the arts, the NEA has prioritized research and evaluation through Art Works, which allots grants that range in amount from $10,000 to $30,000 to support data collection and analysis (Natl. Endowment for the Arts, “Appropriations Request”). By emphasizing research and evaluation of the economic value and impact of the arts, the NEA also aims to enumerate and validate the various leadership roles that the agency can play throughout the federal government (Natl. Endowment for the Arts, “Appropriations Request”). On another note, the NEA has also sought to foster the development of entrepreneurship activities for artists—yet another strategy to enhance the economic prospects of the arts. Overall, the NEA’s emphasis on establishing a form of capacity building for the arts and artists points to a wider trend in the arts community to strengthen and promote the sustainability and competitiveness of the arts during a recessionary period in which the arts may appear to be a “frivolous” or “elitist” concern. To a certain degree, the NEA’s spotlight on communicating the economic value and impact of the arts is divergent from its original aim to promote artistic excellence. However, although private giving to the arts, culture, and humanities is estimated to have risen by 4.1% in 2011 from 2010 or approximately $13.2 billion in total
contributions, such a spotlight may be necessary, as private support for the art is neither as frequent or plentiful as in previous years (Clolery and Hrywna). Chapter Five will illuminate the need for such a spotlight in Madrid.

Challenge America Fast-Track demonstrates two additional shifts by the NEA—to focus on enhancing communities through the arts and to create access to the arts. In many ways, Challenge America Fast-Track also exemplifies the NEA’s renewed emphasis on awarding grants in the interest of the public, as opposed to catering to the sole interest of the arts community. As Wyszomirski and Mulcahy note:

In keeping with the American pluralist tradition, public support has come to be associated with greater access to and awareness of the arts, even as the NEA has sought to foster excellence without becoming identified with any particular artistic perspective. (123)

Challenge America Fast-Track represents an attempt to “democratize” the NEA; it signals that the NEA has reaffirmed its commitment to extend reliable access to the arts to all populations, regardless of geographic, ethnic, economic, or disability limitations. In order to counter charges of geographic bias and maldistribution of grants, mentioned earlier in Chapter Two, the NEA is also steadfastly allocating at least one direct grant to each Congressional district (Natl. Endowment for the Arts, “Appropriations Request”). The strategic effort stems from the NEA’s goal to establish a base of support for the arts, and in turn foster demand for the arts, in rural and suburban communities traditionally underserved by the arts. Challenge America Fast-Track also highlights the NEA’s focus on supporting “informal” arts events held at schools or religious institutions, such as outdoor fairs and festivals, as opposed to “formal” arts events that commonly take place in cultural institutions and galleries in urban areas or cities. In short, the
NEA has sharpened its focus on supporting grassroots or community-based arts events in order to achieve a greater degree of pluralism and diversity. Other components of Challenge America Fast-Track include *The Big Read* and *Shakespeare in American Communities*, and exemplify the NEA’s aim to serve populist and mainstream arts audiences (Natl. Endowment for the Arts, “How the United States”).

Support for *Our Town* is the priority of the NEA and reflects the guiding decision-making principles of the NEA following the global economic recession. In an attempt to leverage and showcase the potential economic and social benefits of the arts, the NEA has turned to the practice of creative placemaking. Many communities, both rural and urban, have begun to utilize the arts as a means to enhance the livability of areas. Through creative placemaking, the arts serve as a tool to animate public and private spaces, rejuvenate structures and streetscapes, improve local business viability and public safety, and bring diverse people together (Markusen and Gadwa 3). Launched in 2011, Our Town provides grants to cities and towns across the U.S. for creative placemaking purposes. According to the NEA’s *Appropriations Request for Fiscal Year 2013*, nearly $10 million of the proposed $73.143 million for direct endowment grants is intended for supporting Our Town. The NEA has remarked that it anticipates serving approximately 115 communities of varying populations throughout the nation (Natl. Endowment for the Arts, “Appropriations Request”). In many ways, Our Town signals an emerging undercurrent in public funding for the arts in the U.S. today—the marketability and usability of the arts to enact community development. In sum, through Art Works, Challenge America Fast-Track, and Our Town, the NEA has sought to expand its base of public support from outside the arts community and to increase the variety and availability cultural resources in the nation.
Throughout its existence, the NEA has repeatedly had to justify federal support of the arts and, in particular, to confront political opposition to the allocation of federal subsidies to the arts. In general, Democrats tend to favor supporting the NEA whereas Republicans do not—why so?

Lance T. Izumi highlights the factors underpinning the traditional Republican stance toward the NEA in *How the Political Right Views Arts Funding*. It can be said that two lines of thinking shape the Republican outlook on federal support for the arts: economic arguments based on free-market theory and artistic judgment and the influence of government bureaucracy and ideology (Izumi 29). The economic arguments stem from the Republican position on reducing national taxes and encouraging private sector investment. According to Izumi, Republicans and other advocates of free enterprise and a reduced public sector contend that beneficiaries of federal subsidies for the arts are those who traditionally consume more art—the wealthy (Izumi 30). As John Ashcroft, former Attorney General of the U.S., once declared in 1997, “Now the opera gets a subsidy from the National Endowment for the Arts, but by and large, Willie Nelson and Garth Brooks don’t” (Martin). In general, federal subsidies for the arts are oriented to be discipline specific, and favor the opera, museums, and classical ballet (Cowen 28). The NEA has consistently defended its activities against routine accusations of elitism.

In *Good and Plenty: The Creative Successes of American Arts Funding*, Tyler Cowen sheds light on the aesthetic approach to federal subsidies for the arts. Cowen suggests that those who share a belief in the necessity of federal funding for the arts, chiefly Democrats, tend to view the arts as a merit good (30). According to Cowen, “Under the aesthetic approach the notion of a just and beautiful society is prior to the value of satisfying individual preferences. Art has elevating and developmental powers, and in this view all democratic citizens have a right to such experiences” (5). Whereas Democrats candidly embrace the aesthetic approach,
Republicans espouse an economic approach that regards the arts as “simply another minority
taste” that does not exhibit “special normative status” (Cowen 5). Cowen includes a surprising
fact that supports the economic approach—the public often pays more respect to baseball players
and bus drivers than to art critics, poets, ballet dancers, or professional actors in the U.S. (5). In
many ways, the statistic evokes long-standing concerns of certain Republicans that the decision
by the NEA to offer direct subsidies to the arts, and by default to recognize the arts as a merit
good, is paternalistic and assumes an artistic judgment on behalf of the public (Cowen 30).

The politically tinged struggle over direct and indirect federal subsidies for the arts is best
evidenced by variations in the types of funding offered by the NEA throughout the past five
decades. In 1972, for example, the NEA initiated a system of direct subsidies and grants to
support individual artists in the U.S. However, in 1994, the NEA axed direct subsidies and grants
to individual artists and focused on indirect subsidies for the arts by leveraging matching
contributions of private support (Cash 21). The NEA developed a form of discretionary funding
by partially underwriting the costs of grants undertaken by private or local institutions, such as
State Arts Agencies and Local Arts Agencies. Moreover, inflammatory controversies over public
funding for the arts during the 1980s and 1990s at the Brooklyn Museum of Art and the
Corcoran Gallery of Art in Washington D.C. also precipitated a shift in NEA funding from direct
to indirect subsidies.

It is important to note that political pressure, especially in light of the controversies
mentioned above and President Ronald Reagan’s attempt to abolish the NEA in 1984, prompted
the NEA to overhaul its grant system and to focus on extending access to the arts (Cash 22). The
focus on access has led to enlarged support for projects that benefit mainstream arts and
audiences, such as folk and traditional arts. The emergence of programs aimed at enhancing
multiculturalism and audience development can also be viewed in light of the NEA’s emphasis on access. Such endeavors respond to the claim that federal subsides for the arts only benefit the wealthy and also expand the base of arts support by creating demand. However, to many members of the arts, access is a guise for not supporting contemporary artistic activity that can be experimental or confrontational. Chapter Three will examine the efforts of the NEA in resolving the dilemma of artistic excellence and access through decentralization to State Arts Agencies (SAAs) and Local Arts Agencies (LAAs).
Chapter 3: State Arts Agencies (SAAs) and Local Arts Agencies (LAAs) in the United States

The distributary network of State Arts Agencies (SAAs) reflects the decentralization, or arms-length paradigm, of public funding for the arts in the U.S. The aim of SAAs, first conceived of during the mid-1960s, is to increase access to the arts in all fifty states and to endow state governments with a greater measure of control over decision-making on public funding for the arts (Natl. Endowment for the Arts, “How the United States”). Following the establishment of the NEA in 1965, the federal government asserted that, in the case of rural and suburban communities, state governments could be more effective in identifying the needs of artists and arts organizations and allocating appropriate resources than the federal government. Proponents of the NEA deemed it advantageous to both the federal and state governments to reduce and moderate the influence of the NEA on public funding for the arts by launching a distributary network of SAAs—thereby enabling a uniform and balanced distribution of resources for artists and arts organizations throughout the U.S. As Chapters One and Two reveal, the impulse to contract the scope and control of the federal government and the tendency to maintain an arms-length distance from any semblance of a top-down approach to governance, are recurring themes in the formation of cultural policy in the U.S. and are also evident in the creation of the SAAs.

While the NEA supplied initial endowments to all fifty states in order to inaugurate SAAs during the mid-1960s, state governments agreed to reserve funds for future appropriations and to ensure the legacy of the agency. Moreover, the NEA required state governments to develop a statewide strategy for the allocation of direct grants (Natl. Endowment for the Arts, “How the United States”). The organization structure of SAAs is similar yet not identical to that of the
NEA. SAAs sought to allow for freedom and flexibility in decision-making on grants and to limit the interplay of politics in public funding for the arts. While board-based governance is similar to the Peer Review/Panel System of the NEA, constituent-driven decision-making is distinctly characteristic of SAAs and more feasible at the state level than the federal level (Lowell and Ondaatje 10).

In the most comprehensive report on SAAs to date, *The Arts and State Governments: At Arm’s Length or Arm in Arm?*, Julia F. Lowell and Elizabeth Heneghan Ondaatje explore the advantages and disadvantages of the governance and structure of SAAs. In general, board-based governance allows for opportunities to include laypeople in the decision-making process, to incorporate the advice of experts on difficult issues, and to foster public-private collaboration (Lowell and Ondaatje 8). As Lowell and Ondaatje aptly note, board-based governance also functions as a “reality check” for policymaking by enabling for greater representation and diversity in terms of geography, culture, and occupation (8). In addition to serving as a “reality check,” board-based governance also acts as a “buffer” that separates the arts from politics and prevents the spillover of partisan bias in the decision-making process (Lowell and Ondaatje 9). The final advantage is a consequence of constituent-driven decision-making, as professional and unbiased panelists are selected based on experience in specific disciplines or arts management, knowledge of the community, and geographic or cultural representation (Lowell and Ondaatje 10). In short, board-based governance and constituent-driven decision-making are effective in safeguarding the evaluation of artistic merit and the recommendation of direct grants to individuals from political, ideological, or personal bias.

The chief disadvantages of SAAs’ governance and structure include marginal visibility in state legislatures and inadequate focus on cultivating audience demand (Lowell and Ondaatje
Lowell and Ondaatje note that SAAs that subscribe to board-based governance are less inclined to be responsive or receptive to state-elected officials (7-10, 39). On the contrary, SAAs with hierarchical governance are liable to state-elected officials and accountability ordinances. Whereas leadership is of a dispersed nature in SAAs with board-based governance, in SAAs with hierarchical governance, single elected officials assume the majority of responsibility and decision-making is entrusted to a lone individual (Lowell and Ondaatje 8-11). SAAs that operate under board-based governance are failing to generate a reliable base of support from state-elected officials. Especially in light of a volatile economy and frequent modifications and reductions in state budgets, SAAs are “losing ground to other types of state expenditures” (RAND Corporation). Although appropriations for SAAs are largely derived from the state government and no longer dependent on the NEA for annual bloc grants, they are more susceptible to fluctuations in state budgets—a detrimental factor that has so far led to the termination and consolidation of two SAAs in Wisconsin and Kansas (Natl. Endowment for the Arts, “How the United States”). An emerging challenge for SAAs is the improbability of an increase in state budgets in the near future—state expenditures for the arts have consistently decreased in comparison to other types of state expenditures since 1989 (Lowell and Ondaatje 20). If the primary source of SAAs’ appropriations continues to diminish, many will be forced to confront fates similar to those of Wisconsin and Kansas (Fig. 9).
The consolidation of the Wisconsin Arts Board (WAB) into the Department of Tourism and the absolute closure of the Kansas Arts Commission also point to another challenge for SAAs—the inability to cultivate sufficient audience demand, participation, and development (Zakaras and Lowell 3-5). Paradoxically, extensive focus on serving the needs of the arts community rather than the public has produced the effect of fragmenting political support for SAAs. Although SAAs previously held firm to the belief that support from the arts community could be effectively leveraged to increase support from the public, the outcome has been less successful than predicted. Lowell and Ondaatje succinctly summarize the issue as follows: “Given current political and budgetary trends, however, SAAs must be able to demonstrate that they serve a wide spectrum of state residents and that those residents highly value the arts experiences that SAAs make possible” (12). The founding of the SAAs during the mid-1960s coincided with widespread support for the arts from the public—partially inspired by President Kennedy and the subsequent establishment of the NEA in 1965. However, SAAs have had to
cope with shifting attitudes concerning the scope of the federal and state governments, and in recent years, the public is increasingly wary of unnecessary or unjustified state expenditures. During a period of economic turmoil, matching those who pay for the arts and those who benefit from the arts is evermore necessary. In other words, if SAAs’ activity is not held accountable to the public, SAAs overwhelmingly risk elimination today. In effect, SAAs are following the path of the NEA by focusing on communicating the economic value and impact of the arts to state government and state residents. In many ways, the effort is two-fold—to increase the visibility of SAAs amongst state-elected officials and to reinforce the necessity—not luxury—of SAAs to state residents. Lowell and Ondaatje suggest that state expenditures on entitlement programs and unfunded federal mandates, such as Medicaid, the No Child Left Behind Act, and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, have prompted state governments to reduce or eliminate state expenditures for SAAs (21). Coupled with state residents’ opposition to an increase in taxes, SAAS are dependent upon unreliable annual revenue streams, such as hotel/ motel state occupancy fees or the municipal occupancy tax (New Jersey State Council on the Arts). While the NEA is committed to upholding support for the network of SAAs that it created, annual appropriations to SAAs declined by $25 million in 2009, by $37 million in 2010, by $17.9 million in 2011, and by $13.9 million in 2012—the downward spiral is not expected to halt soon (Natl. Endowment for the Arts, “How the United States”) (Fig. 10). In sum, despite continuous support from the NEA, SAAs must nevertheless contend against the possibility of elimination.
SAAs’ efforts to increase visibility and to cultivate audience demand, participation, and development stem from difficulties in quantifying the benefit of the arts and contentious debates over “controversial” art funded by SAAs. The challenges facing SAAs today can be better understood if contextualized in a historical narrative that parallels that of the NEA to a certain degree. Similar to the NEA, the SAAs operated under a set of so called “elite” assumptions (Lowell 6). First, the SAAs distinguished between forms of highbrow and lowbrow art. Secondly, it was understood that the arts, and in particular highbrow arts, benefitted not only individuals but also the public at large—recall the civilizing and aspirational chords on the arts sung by Senators Claiborne Pell, Hubert Humphrey, and Jacob Javits during the creation of the NEA? Thirdly, the public justified federal government support for the arts partially out of fear that, if left to the whims of the private sector, the quality and quantity of the arts could easily diminish in the U.S. (Lowell 4-6). During the 1970s, however, amidst protests against the NEA and SAAs’ limited definition of the arts and an all too narrow focus on supporting the highbrow arts, U.S. cultural policy embraced a “populist” approach to the arts. Critics provoked the shift
from “elite” to “populist” assumptions by arguing that the majority of the public did not take advantage of the investments made by the NEA and SAAs to institutions solely dedicated to the highbrow arts—albeit to institutions dispersed geographically. In addition, critics also pointed to the fact that SAAs failed to recognize and chart the number of ways in which the public could benefit from or participate in the arts. It is important to note that populism appeared in multiple forms in the strategies exhibited by SAAs thereafter. Through voluntary or mandated decentralization to local arts agencies (LAAs), SAAs aimed to provide local stakeholders with decision-making power and agency over the arts (Lowell and Ondaatje 15, 47). Other SAAs sought to expand the definition of the arts by including folk and traditional arts or other forms of art directed toward ethnic and minority populations. Furthermore, some SAAs extended the functions of the agency beyond awarding grants by developing programs for arts education and community-based artists (Lowell 9-10). As Lowell notes in *State Arts Agencies 1965-2003: Whose Interests to Serve?*, following the 1970s, SAAs focused on diversifying and increasing the production of the arts rather than heightening consumption of the arts already being produced (12). In other words, SAAs chose to raise supply over demand. During the 1980s, political support for SAAs from the arts community, and particularly from large arts and cultural institutions, eroded as a result of the strategies undertaken by SAAs during the 1970s. As Lowell states, “Most members of the leadership (and audience) of the majors were either unable or unwilling to undertake significant lobbying efforts for their SAAs. Many turned to lobbying for line items for their own institutions rather than working for increases to their SAA’s overall budget” (14-15). In fact, the stance exhibited by large arts and cultural institutions toward SAAs during the 1980s reflects a divisive trend—as SAAs embarked on a campaign to increase
diversity through a populist approach, large arts and cultural institutions aimed for artistic excellence through an elitist approach.

Similar to the NEA, SAAs have experienced a great deal of political and economic tumult, as well as fluctuations in support and opposition from both the arts community and the public. While board-based governance and constituent-driven decision making present a fair share of advantages and disadvantages for SAAs, the chief success of SAAs lies in the fact that the base of artists and arts organizations has expanded across the U.S., from urban to rural areas. While the arms-length paradigm and low visibility of SAAs to state-elected officials and the public has made it difficult for SAAs to cultivate audience demand and political support during a period of budgetary cuts, both factors have also aided SAAs in maintaining standards of freedom and flexibility in decision-making. However, it is important to note that such standards differ according to each SAA. For example, the Texas Commission on the Arts, the SAA of Texas, is prohibited from sponsoring projects containing sexual content (Lowell 23). On the other hand, the New York State Council on the Arts (NYSCA) is a pioneering SAA and is relatively less constrained by anti-obscenity or anti-pornography legislation, thereby allowing for a greater degree of freedom, flexibility, and transparency in decision-making (Lowell 15). In general, the high concentration of artists and arts organizations in New York City has fostered competition in applying for and receiving grants by the NYSCA. In effect, the NYSCA is able to underscore artistic quality and innovation in its selection process. In other words, in contrast to the Texas Commission on the Arts, the NYSCA is able to exercise a greater degree of agency and authority in its decision-making process. It is also worth noting that the NYSCA possesses the greatest legislative appropriation and total revenue of all the SAAs, as well as one of the highest total revenue per capita ratios (Lowell 54).
The disparity between the Texas Commission on the Arts and the NYSCA illustrates the extent to which geographic location can impact the decision-making process and the types of projects that receive funding. The further decentralization of SAAs to Local Arts Agencies (LAAs) is the result of an attempt by the former and the NEA to both eclipse total responsibility in the allocation of grants by transferring it to local communities and to adhere to the pluralist tradition of the U.S.

In many ways, LAAs exhibit the peak of decentralization and the arms-length paradigm in the U.S. model of arts funding. Both the NEA and SAAs direct funds to LAAs in an attempt to endow greater decision-making power to local communities, to expand the base of support for artists and arts organizations in the U.S., and to reduce or prevent involvement in the allocation of potentially controversial grants. Although decentralization to LAAs originated during the “populist revolt” of the 1970s, it remains a priority of the NEA and SAAs to support LAAs through annual bloc grants and mandatory re-granting. For example, the NEA funneled approximately two-thirds of its 2012 appropriation for Our Town to projects led by LAAs (Natl. Endowment for the Arts, “How the United States”). On a similar note, the NYSCA supports nearly 31 LAAs, dispersed throughout each county, through a permanent decentralization mechanism (New York State Council on the Arts).

The advantages of LAAs are both numerous and strategic. First, LAAs are able to better adapt to real-time and actual conditions and demonstrate a heightened awareness of the needs and norms of local communities. Second, members of LAAs are also better integrated in local communities and possess the leadership capital to attract a substantial amount of resources. Third, LAAs distribute the majority of direct grants today—more so than the NEA and SAAs combined.
The advantages of LAAs are evidenced by the success of New York City’s LAAs, including the New York City Department of Cultural Affairs (DCLA) and the New York Foundation for the Arts (NYFA). Organizations that support the arts and culture in New York City include Chashama and the Lower Manhattan Cultural Council (LMCC) among others. Similar to SAAs, LAAs are also funded through a dedicated stream of revenue from municipal tax.

In order to gauge the success of New York City’s LAAs, it is crucial to mention the importance of artists and arts organizations to the city itself. As mentioned earlier, the success of LAAs is overwhelmingly contingent upon the geographic location and the needs and norms of local communities. In many ways, Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg has justified the LAA practices of New York City by emphasizing both the merit and economic value of artists and arts organizations to the city. At the Creative New York Conference on April 4, 2006, held at the Museum of Modern Art, Bloomberg described the arts as the “heart and soul” of New York City (Center for an Urban Future et al.).

New York City hosts approximately 1,300 arts organizations that collectively employ nearly 8% of the labor force of New York City (Coates 4). In terms of total revenue, artists and arts organizations generate an annual sum of $5.5 billion (Bowles 15). The statistics on artistic production are equally striking—In 2011 artists and arts organizations presented 20,119 live productions, 56,466 performances, 4,242 exhibitions, 89,879 classes and lectures, 3,058 tours, 6,783 premieres, and 10,821 workshops (Coates 5). Moreover, 35.5 million people attended events hosted by artists and arts organizations in New York City in 2011 (Coates 6). The statistics illustrate the fact that demand for the arts and culture is resilient in New York City despite the decelerating effects of the global economic recession.
Bloomberg has emphasized such buoyant statistics on artists and arts organizations in New York City to justify and encourage support for LAA activities. While New York City’s LAAs support traditional grant-making activity, given the overwhelming cost of rent in New York City, a great deal of the LAAs’ activity is direct toward creating affordable live and work space for artists. An article in Crain’s New York Business titled “Artists Fleeing the City” reports that the high cost of living is compelling artists to abandon New York City in favor of other cities that boast high livability and similar amenities (Souccar). New York City faces competition from cities in the U.S. and across the world, notably Philadelphia, Boston, Berlin, and Lyon (Bowles 22). In effect, Bloomberg has implemented a cohesive and innovative series of LAA policies to address the issue of live and work space for artists and arts organizations. 4

The most notable and effective of the LAA policies is the “Incubators and Workspaces” pilot to match artists and vacant real estate (New York City Economic Development Corporation, “Incubators”). Carried out by the DCA, the New York City Economic Development Corporation, and Chashama—a non-profit arts organization—the program has expanded the workspace of Chashama at the Brooklyn Army Terminal by 60,000 square feet to serve the needs of more than 75 artists (New York City Economic Development Corporation).

As demonstrated by New York City’s LAAs, the decentralization of the U.S. model of funding for the arts strategically allows for greater risk taking and experimentation at the community level. Furthermore, LAAs, more than the NEA or SAAs, are able to offer direct support and subsidies to artists and arts organizations and are also more cognizant of the needs and norms of both the arts community and the public. LAAs, especially in New York City, are

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4 The Urbancanvas Design Competition is a fascinating contest that challenges artists and designers to use temporary protective structures throughout New York City as a blank canvas for public art. The program is supported by a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation to the Mayor’s Fund to Advance New York City. The structures to be redesigned include construction fences, sidewalk sheds, supported scaffolds, and cocoon systems. The program is similar to the New Deal for the Arts during the Great Depression.
also able to support formal arts events without frequent charges of elitism and exclusionism. Finally, the activity of LAAs in New York City exhibits greater support for artistic excellence and production by responding directly to the needs of artists and arts organizations. Overall, LAAs are absolutely crucial in ensuring the stabilization, sustainability, and democratization of support for the arts in the U.S.
Chapter 4: The Evolution of Patrocinio de las Artes (State Sponsorship of the Arts) in Spain

Chapter One detailed the evolution of public funding for the arts in the U.S.—a gradual and complex process whose origins can be traced to the emergence of Puritanism and whose actual formation can be dated as recently as 1965. In general, the development of cultural policy in Europe is presented as the counter narrative to that of the U.S.—a narrative so deeply entrenched in the history of patronage that cultural policy scholars and historians alike have encountered great difficulty in marking an exact point of departure for state sponsorship of the arts. In many ways, state sponsorship of the arts is commonly viewed as a norm in Europe, and one that is frequently treated as an unstipulated right by its citizens. In the case of Spain, state sponsorship of the arts is ubiquitous and visibly manifested in the large number of formal and informal arts events open to the public, often at subsidized admission rates or free of charge. On any given day and in any given province, one can choose from a wide array of state-sponsored activities for the arts—ranging from formal exhibitions at large arts and cultural institutions such as the Museo del Prado to informal annual celebrations and festivals open to the public such as the Día Internacional del Libro (International Day of the Book). In fact, the Ministerio de Educación, Cultura, y Deporte (Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sport), the chief government agency responsible for legislation and state sponsorship of the arts, has launched a campaign titled España es Cultura (Spain is Culture) that boldly declares the nation synonymous with culture and serves as a comprehensive resource on cultural heritage and cultural products available in Spain for both citizens and foreigners (Fig. 11) (Ministerio de Educación, Cultura, y Deporte, “España”). Given the primacy of the arts in Spain today, as well as an enduring appetite for the arts by the Spanish public and tourists, it becomes apparent why cultural policy scholars have faced trouble in navigating the exact historical course of state sponsorship of the arts.
Throughout history the arts have exhibited, as they undoubtedly will continue to do, a strong presence in Spain. Whereas cultural policy scholars have traditionally only focused on either the “ancient” or “modern” historical context of state sponsorship of the arts, in this section, I will attempt to frame the topic by synthesizing both points of departure and summarizing competing versions of the development for state sponsorship of the arts in Spain. Subsequently, Chapter Five will examine the current situation of state sponsorship of the arts in Spain, especially in light of the economic crisis, by drawing upon patterns, trends, and principles from its historical and structural development.


To begin with, some cultural policy scholars and historians favor charting the history of state sponsorship of the arts in Spain from the moment that the nation became a democracy in 1975 and then contrasting the democratic policies against those of General Francisco Franco during the dictatorship period from 1939 until Franco’s death in 1975. This understanding can be viewed as the “modern” context of cultural policy in Spain. On the other hand, a rich body of scholarship also exists on the “ancient” context of patronage in Spain, particularly in reference to the Spanish monarchial acquisition of art. It is my belief, however, that the evolution of state sponsorship of the arts in Spain can be categorized into three distinct periods, beginning with an overview of the patronage activities of the Spanish monarchy, transitioning to cultural policy practices under the dictatorship of Franco, and concluding with an emphasis on the democratic
policies after 1975 and a focus on the cultural policies set forth by the European Union after 1986.

In contrast to the system of public funding for the arts in the U.S., which is characterized by pragmatism and a public-private balancing act, cultural policy in Spain, and in Europe in general, is steeped in “theoretical and philosophical roots and longer traditions of public support for value of the arts and culture” (Wyszomirski 39). The notion of “roots” is important to keep in mind as we begin to unravel broader concepts of the arts and culture that prevail in Spanish society today.⁵ Early forms of Spanish patronage are more closely aligned with the dynamic of a patron-artist relationship, best evidenced by the Medici clan of Florence during the fifteenth-century age of Humanist Renaissance and later practiced as crown patronage by the Antiguo Régimen (Old Regime) of Spain. Hapsburg ruler Philip IV, who reigned from 1621 until 1640, is remembered for his crown patronage of the arts and a rich tradition of employing artists to entertain and astound the Spanish court. Philip IV commissioned several masterpieces of Spanish art, including portraits by Spanish artists Bartolomé Esteban Murillo and Diego Velázquez (Fig. 12).

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⁵ Interestingly, one can trace the origin of all art and culture, as most art history textbooks do, to images of painted bulls and horses discovered in the Paleolithic art caves of present-day Spain and France. See Dissanayake 61-74.
While all of the forms of patronage mentioned above play a significant role in shaping predominant views on the arts and culture in Spanish and European society more generally, the form of patronage most directly related to the contemporary concept of state sponsorship of the arts is that of the contributions made by the Casa de Borbón (House of Bourbon, 1700-1828) during the eighteenth century. The primary factor that distinguishes the patronage of the Bourbons from that of their predecessors is inclusiveness, as the Bourbons intended for state sponsorship of the arts to reform society, not simply to benefit the monarchy.

First, it is important to note that the contributions of the Bourbons were primarily directed to Madrid, the city that had become the capital of Spain in 1561 under the reign of Philip II (Noel 28). As the capital, Madrid was the physical and symbolic seat of political and ecclesiastical power, first for the Habsburgs and later for the Bourbons. Although the monarchy
had undertaken a number of measures to beautify the city, such as the expansion of the *Parque del Buen Retiro* (Buen Retiro Park) and the creation of *paseos*, “comfortable, safe, decent, and well-ordered spaces” that functioned as sprawling boulevards, improvements to the city chiefly benefitted the monarchy and the aristocratic elite (Noel 27-28). Historian Charles C. Noel notes the decaying condition of Madrid at the time:

Other visitors from more sophisticated capitals noticed the lack of attractive faculties for public socializing as poor *Madrileños* gathered with friends in the streets and the rich largely stayed secluded behind closed doors. Visitors almost always remarked on the absence of monumental buildings, grand squares and imposing vistas, and found ugly and mean the architecture of nearly all private houses and mansions. Even great churches, in this cathedral-less city, were few. (28)

Madrid desperately required both urban and social reform, and Bourbon state sponsorship of the arts attempted to remedy the situation. Enlightenment ideas on the power of education and culture to foment social and economic change served as an impetus for the transformation of Madrid. Throughout the eighteenth century, the Bourbons embarked on an extensive agenda to create and expand public institutions for the promotion of education and culture that included the following projects:

- In 1712, Philip V created the *Biblioteca Real* (Royal Library) in Madrid (Biblioteca Nacional de España).
- In 1738, Ferdinand V authorized construction for a *Coliseo* (Coliseum) to host theatrical productions and operas—an antecedent to the *Teatro Real* (Royal Theater) (Facultad de Geografía e Historia de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid).
− In 1752, Ferdinand VI founded the *Real Academia de Bellas Artes de San Fernando* (Royal Academy of Fine Arts of San Fernando)—the only collection of fine art open to the public until the opening of the *Museo del Prado* in 1819 (Real Academia de Bellas Artes de San Fernando).

− In 1767, Charles III permitted public access to the *Parque del Buen Retiro*, originally intended to serve as leisure grounds for the monarchy.

− In 1775, Charles III commissioned Juan de Villanueva to design a museum for the display of natural and scientific artifacts—the museum would become the *Museo del Prado* (Museo Nacional del Prado).

− In 1819, Ferdinand VII amassed the monarchial collection of art in the completed *Museo del Prado* and extended access to the public.

Many of the reforms listed above were intended to affect the physical improvement of Madrid through a “widespread campaign for “good taste” in all of the arts” (Noel 29). The newfound public institutions not only aimed to reform and dignify Madrid, but also to serve as models for improvements in other parts of the nation. Inspired by the notion that “the arts, particularly painting and architecture, were crucial vehicles for change,” the Bourbons also invested in traditional crown patronage (Noel 31). For example, Bourbon ruler Philip V played an instrumental role in cultivating the patron-artist relationship by creating the Santa Bárbara workshop for tapestry production, most often used to decorate the palaces of the monarchy or the mansions of aristocratic elites. Whereas tapestry production declined in other regions of Europe, under the patronage of Charles III, the Santa Bárbara workshop continued to flourish until the 1800s and produced striking designs, most notably the *cartones* (cartoons) of Francisco Goya (Campbell).
While the Bourbons invited artists from France and Italy to decorate royal edifices and to paint portraits of the monarch and other aristocratic elites, the dynasty also ushered in a period of remarkable productivity and recognition for Spanish artists such as Murillo, Velázquez, and Goya. Although the Bourbons initially embraced French manners and styles during the first half of the eighteenth century, the second half of the century witnessed the rejection of French-influenced customs and a pronouncement of “Spanish-ness,” especially in the arts (Noyes 197). As Dorothy Noyes suggests, elites in late-eighteenth-century Madrid imitated urban plebian fashions as a form of rebellion against the dominance of French fashion and taste—a phenomenon termed majismo (maja signifies “urban plebian woman”) (197). The cartones of Goya best illustrate the culture of majismo, in which majas and majos (“urban plebian men”) are shown frolicking in and around Madrid and flaunting the latest Spanish, not French, fashions of the day (Fig. 13) (Noyes 197). The representation of uniquely Spanish characteristics in painting, along with the Bourbons’ elevation of the reputations of Spanish artists, led to the artificial classification of Spanish artists as a distinct artistic “School.” Incongruities in artistic style or content, and even differences in Spanish provincial styles, no longer loomed large—it only mattered that the art and artists belonged to the “Spanish School.” The designation of a “Spanish School” of painters points to broader concepts of nationhood, nation building, and raza (race) embedded in state sponsorship of the arts (Afinoguénova 328). Following the Peninsular War, or Guerra de la Independencia (War of Independence) against France (1808-14), the existence of a “Spanish School” of artists served to bolster the national spirit of Spain. Following the Glorious Revolution of 1868, the monarchy transferred ownership of the Museo del Prado to the state. The concept of a “Spanish School” of artists led to the development of the Museo del Prado into a museum that represented a centralized and bordered Spanish nation (Afinoguénova 319).
Eugenia Afinoguénova succinctly remarks that the Museo del Prado embodied the “cognitive consolidation of Spain’s national culture by promoting the notion of a “Spanish School” of art” (319).

In sum, the theoretical and philosophical roots of state sponsorship of the arts in Spain can be traced to a number of factors. The Bourbons’ creation of numerous educational and cultural institutions, such as the Biblioteca Real, the Real Academia de Bellas Artes de San Fernando, and the Museo del Prado, were rooted in an impetus for urban reform in eighteenth-century Madrid. On another note, the Bourbons’ crown patronage of Spanish artists, primarily for decorative and portraiture paintings, also reveals motives for glorifying the monarchy and aristocracy. Finally, the emergence of a “Spanish School” of artists had connotations of nationhood, nation building, race, and Spanish identity, especially in light of the Bourbon integration of culture as a feature of political economy. The combination of such factors points to the importance of national patrimony in shaping Spanish attitudes on state sponsorship of the
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arts. In contrast to the U.S., state sponsorship of the arts in Spain bore a direct connection to the preservation of the political, social, and economic interests of the nation and its citizens.

The “modern” context of state sponsorship of the arts in Spain can be traced to the Ley Moyano (Moyano Act) of 1857—the first attempt by Parliament to legislate the fields of education and culture (Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos). Although the legislation primarily introduced a system of compulsory primary and secondary education, it also enabled Parliament to conceive of and implement a legal framework for the establishment of several libraries, fine arts academies, and archaeological museums (Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos). During the Spanish Restoration, from 1875 until the declaration of the Second Spanish Republic in 1931, Spain enjoyed a period of political stability, thereby allowing for the advancement of education and culture into the twentieth century. By 1915, Spain had established a Ministry of Public Information (1910) and a Directorate General of Fine Arts (Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos). During the early twentieth century, Spain also sponsored a number of archaeological digs throughout the nation and engaged in an ambitious program to document and detail sites of historical and artistic importance to national patrimony. The Catálogo Monumental y Artístico de la Nación (National Catalog of Monumental and Artistic Sites) provides a comprehensive inventory and account of historical and artistic sites in each province (Fig. 14) (Brinquis).
The brevity of the Second Spanish Republic, from 1931 to 1936, did not preclude the government from achieving remarkable feats in making the arts and culture accessible to those who resided in remote and rural areas. In particular, the *Patronato de Misiones Pedagógicas* (Educational Missions), decreed on May 29, 1931, aimed to rectify the expansive gap between rural and urban areas concerning access to the arts and culture. The leaders of the *Misiones Pedagógicas* intended to contract the distance between rural and urban areas in terms of access to the arts and culture, as the overwhelming majority of arts and cultural institutions were located in urban areas. The *Misiones Pedagógicas* organized travelling exhibitions and lectures on music, theater, visual arts, film, and literature (Residencia de Estudiantes). *El Museo del Pueblo* ("The People’s Museum” or “Village Museum”) consisted of a collection of fourteen copies of
famous paintings by Spanish artists that were transported to villages by van and accompanied by guides who would explain the paintings to the villagers (Fig. 15) (Residencia de Estudiantes). As Manuel B. Cossió, President of the Misiones Pedagógicas, stated in a testimonial on the Museo del Pueblo in 1932:

And if men invented painting, which apparently is a luxury, many centuries before they invented things as useful and necessary like pots, hoes, and plows, and if they have continued painting, perhaps due to the irresistible yearning to create beautiful things, perhaps it is not totally insane for the just task undertaken by the Misiones to bring some modest copies, at least, of the best paintings held as magnificent treasures by the nation’s museums, to the rural people, so they can share the city people’s enjoyment and education. (Residencia de Estudiantes)

The statement by Cossió touches upon significant hallmarks of state sponsorship of the arts in Spain. Not only does Cossió acknowledge the redemptive and cultivating power of the arts, specifically painting, but he also points to its direct connection to national patrimony and “Spanish-ness”; his words assume that painting is a manifestation of both the Spanish nation and Spanish identity, and all Spaniards possess the right to encounter and enjoy it. On another note, Cossió also supports the view that the arts no longer require justification through the paradigm of utilitarianism; rather that they merit support as an exercise in creativity and tradition. The claim of painting as part of a Spanish tradition is quite different from justifications laid forth by the U.S. for public funding for the arts. The association of the arts with tradition lays the groundwork for continuity and permanence of the arts in Spain—supporting the arts is, in some ways, parallel to sustaining Spanish tradition. As illustrated in Chapter One, the lack of consensus about the role and value of the arts in the U.S., and simultaneously the lack of widespread support, are derived, in part, from the disassociation of the arts and a national tradition. In contrast to Spain, the U.S. emphasizes the utilitarianism of the arts in order to justify public funding for the arts and to maximize the base of support.

Although brief, the Second Spanish Republic designated the arts as a priority of the nation and a vehicle for reform and education. Following the Spanish Civil War from 1936 to 1939, the victory of the Nationalists led to the establishment of a Fascist dictatorship under the leadership of General Francisco Franco. The progressive attempts by the Second Spanish Republic to support the arts and potentially introduce an expansive system of public funding for the arts regressed under the reign of Franco. The arts no longer functioned as a vehicle for reform and education but rather functioned as a vehicle of propaganda to legitimize the dictatorship of Franco and to manipulate public opinion in favor of the Nationalists. In many ways, the arts
became implicated as an essential component of Franco’s cultura de la represión (culture of repression) (Idarreta 219). As the victors of the Spanish Civil War, the Nationalists sought to solidify and reinforce their defeat over the Republicans by eliminating any trace of opposition and suppressing the political and cultural counterrevolution of the Spanish Civil War (Cabaleiro 1). The arts served the purpose of imposing upon the nation an agenda dominated by zealous nationalism and fervent Catholicism.

The cultura de la represión signifies a period during which the dictatorship of Franco manipulated and subjugated the arts to politics and the ideology of the Nationalists and Fascism. From the standpoint of Franquismo, nationalism became equated with support for the Nationalists. In effect, Franco purged several cultural institutions and academies that pledged support to the Second Spanish Republic, and many artists were either persecuted or exiled abroad for their political convictions. Some of the most celebrated and accomplished Spanish artists either forcibly or voluntarily fled Spain, among them Salvador Dalí, Joan Miró, Pablo Picasso, and Luis Buñuel; many other less-famous artists left as well (Guerra 13). Franco implemented an aggressive campaign of censorship against subversive, especially Communist, elements in all channels of communication (Cabaleiro 2). In terms of legislation, the Ley de la Prensa or Ley Súñer (Press Act) of 1938 ushered in a lengthy period of state censorship and monopoly over the proliferation and transmission of information (Idarreta 221-23). The Ley de la Prensa not only applied to journalism, but also to the arts, radio, television, and film (Idarreta 221-23). The preamble of the Ley de la Prensa clearly articulates Franquista intentions to “restore the rank of Spain as a united, great, and free nation” and for all mediums of communication to function “in the permanent service of national interest” (Idarreta 224). Franco also established specific agencies for the control and dissemination of propaganda, notably the
Delegación Nacional de Prensa y Propaganda (National Delegation of Press and Propaganda) (Idarreta 221-22). The Ley de la Prensa and the Delegación Nacional de Prensa y Propaganda served to mandate the influence of nationalism in nearly all forms of public opinion and to institute statutory punishment for those individuals or organizations not adhering to Franquista prescriptions on communication. From the Franquista viewpoint, the arts ought to be modified in order to adequately represent the dominant ideology of the nation and moreover, to be emblematic of “la gloria del imperio” (“the glory of the empire”) (Cabaleiro 1). In an effort to develop guidelines for the creation of contemporary art, Franco turned to Spanish heritage to derive suitable aspects that conformed to his conservative ideas—including traits from art of the Middle Ages, Baroque, and Counterreformation periods (Cabaleiro 1). Furthermore, Franco admired the historicism and classicism of the nineteenth century and the neoclassicism of Juan de Villanueva, architect of the Museo del Prado (Fig. 16) (Cabaleiro 1). In general, Franco favored figurative art that could be easily comprehended, that could transmit clear messages, and whose content depicted historic, patriotic, or moral content.

16 Villanueva, Juan de. Museo del Prado. 1785-1819. Alec and/or Marlene Hartill, Madrid.
During the 1940s, Franco undertook an extensive mission to re-sacralise Spain and to restore the nation to its traditional and Catholic status (Cabaleiro 1). Franco launched the reconstruction of several religious edifices and, in 1942, founded the *Misiones Populares* (Popular Missions) dedicated to mass Catholicization (Cabaleiro 1). As a result, in addition to promoting an aggressive nationalistic and militaristic approach to the arts, Franco also imposed strict moral guidelines and advanced religious art. Franco’s defense of Catholicism was intended by him to reinforce the interrelation of order, obedience, and severity in Spanish society. Franco’s predilection for the arts rejected subjectivity and embraced collective consciousness and memory defined by *Franquismo* itself. In effect, Franco labeled abstract art or any art that encouraged systems of democracy, subjectivity, and liberation as systems of disorder. Moreover, any “outsider” art or art by marginalized or so called “subversive” groups, such as Jews, Masons, or Communists, Franco either prohibited or defamed (Cabaleiro 2).

Following the 1945 defeat of Italy and Germany during World War II, Franco initiated a process oriented toward the integration of Spanish political practices with the Western capitalist world (García 86). Franco sensed an urgency to introduce a series of internal and external reforms aimed at bolstering the economy and improving the national image of Spain to the world. In effect, Franco triggered a period of economic development, through which a majority of the population experienced an improvement in the standard of living. Externally, Franco also emphasized the fact that Spain had been one of the first nations to fight against Communism, which in turn, facilitated diplomatic relations with the U.S. Noemi de Haro García aptly notes that the world conveniently ignored the violent origins of Franquismo as Franco stressed that Spain possessed an unusual number of peculiarities, or *excepcionalismo español* (Spanish exceptionalism) (86). Franco utilized these arguments in accordance with the emerging “global”
aesthetic of abstract expressionism, (or informalismo in Spain), to manipulate the avant-garde to represent a myth of the dictatorship as forward thinking and approachable. During the 1950s and 1960s, the dictatorship supported a number of cultural activities that set into motion a Franquista cultural policy that liaised with the avant-garde.

Alicia Fuentes Vega suggests that during the 1950s and 1960s, Franco attempted to befriend the avant-garde in order to realize el Milagro Español (Spanish Miracle)—the economic transformation of Spain through modernization and liberalization (183). The Ley Fraga (Law of Fraga) of 1966, prompted by the placement of Manuel Fraga Iribarne as the Minister of Information and Tourism, created an opening in the harsh censorship measures of the Ley de la Prensa of 1938 (Idarreta 226). The effort can be characterized as a feeble attempt at deregulation and a fluke in actually supporting the avant-garde or enabling greater freedom of expression. In tandem with the Franquista policy of apertura (openness) during the 1950s and 1960s, Franco sought to present the nation through the lens of cosmopolitanism (Idarreta 226-30). Franco aimed to fabricate a discourse on modernity that appeared credible and, above all, adequately representative of the conservatism espoused by Franquismo (Vega 187). Therefore, Franco selectively supported the avant-garde. For example, Miguel Cabañas Bravo has argued that the dictatorship strategically devised a celebration of the Bienal Hispanoamericana de Arte (19-22). As such, Spain continued to deceptively demonstrate its capacity to discover experimental and fresh fields of influence. Franco not only sought to create and solidify a Hispanic brotherhood, but also to expose the common cultures of the Western capitalist world and Latin American countries (Vega 188). Vega contends that Franco manipulated the avant-garde by culturally exporting the latter through the selling point of lo español (“Spanish-ness”) (187-89). At the Venice Biennale of 1952, the Spanish Pavilion presented art by avant-garde artists of
informalismo such as Antoni Tàpies as a representation of Spain. Franquismo exaggerated the identification of informalismo with lo español by emphasizing certain artists’ affinity for traditional Spanish painting, such as avant-garde artist Antonio Saura’s obsession with Goya (Vega 188). The cultural policy of Franco during the 1950s and 1960s is similar to the activities of the CIA to manipulate abstract expressionism in the U.S. to mirror the politics and ideology of the Cold War period—a false reflection of freedom and democracy through abstraction.

It was not until the death of Franco in 1975 that the cultura de la represión began to soften. From 1976 to 1977, the restored monarchy ushered in reforms of the Ley de la Prensa of 1938 and the Ley Fraga of 1966 and abolished the Franquismo agencies for the control of press and propaganda (Villarroya 3). The healing of a nation, however, did not actually manifest until the adoption of the Constitution in 1978. As Anna Villarroya notes, “The Constitution of 1978 and the charters of regional autonomy set up under its aegis, initiated a period of freedom of the press and artistic expression, combined with greater state activity in disseminating culture and in giving full recognition to the cultural and linguistic diversity of Spain” (3). In light of the aforementioned reforms, some exiled artists returned to Spain as the nation attempted to redefine the status of the artist in a democratic society—although the majority did not (Guerra 15). Under Picasso’s mandate, Guernica, the famed painting that depicts the human destruction wrought by the Nazi bombing of Guernica in Basque Country, did not return to Spain until 1981—only after the nation had become a democracy (Hilton). Instead, the powerful reminder of the human cost of the Spanish Civil War and the brutality of Franquismo resided in the Museum of Modern Art in New York City until its proper restoration to Spain.

The death of Franco marked the transition from dictatorship to democracy in Spain and sparked the liberalization of Spanish society. As the remnants of Franquismo began to wane,
Spain moved toward a greater sense of acceptance and political, economic, social, and cultural freedom. That which may have been considered a taboo or explicitly forbidden under the reign of Franco gradually became normalized into Spanish society. The Spanish renewal of open-mindedness accelerated the capacity of the arts to flourish on an international and cutting-edge platform—Spain and its artists could once again engage with and participate in the discourse of a democratic society. In fact, many Spaniards may locate the shift from modern to “contemporary” in the moment of liberation for Spain. As Villarroya remarks, “Economic and educational development, together with the greater class equilibrium obtained after the 1960s, explains the relaxed approach adopted by Spaniards to the return of democracy and subsequent membership in the European Community” (3). In many ways, the relative lack of controversy in the founding of the Ministerio de Cultura in 1977 and the scope and range of its activities is a distinct contrast from the complications surrounding the establishment of the NEA in the U.S. Chapter Five will explore the structure of the Spanish system of public funding for the arts and subsequently compare it to and contrast it with that of the U.S.
Chapter 5A: The Structure of Patrocinio de las Artes (State Sponsorship of the Arts) in Spain

The evolution of patrocinio de las artes (state sponsorship of the arts) in Spain is unmistakably linked to the concept of national patrimony. Following the death of Franco, Spain sought to revitalize those aspects of national patrimony that Franquismo had rejected and or deplored. The collective impulse to restore the national patrimony of Spain, combined with the rapid liberalization of Spanish society, prompted the creation of the Ministerio de Cultura (Ministry of Culture) by Real Decreto (Royal Decree) on July 4, 1977 (Moreno 225). The Ministerio de Cultura replaced the Ministerio de la Información y el Turismo (Ministry of Information and Tourism) of the Franco regime and assumed the latter’s responsibilities for protecting national heritage and promoting the fine arts, as well as film, theater, music, and dance (Moreno 225). In contrast to the propagandistic and manipulative cultural policy of the Ministerio de la Información y el Turismo and Franquismo, the Ministerio de Cultura revealed an interest in actively promoting contemporary art. During the final years of the dictatorship, many intellectuals, writers, and artists grew impatient for diversity, plurality, and liberty in the political and cultural spheres. Isaac Ait Moreno claims that the open-minded approach of the Ministerio de Cultura directly corresponded with the progressive cultural climate following the democratic transition and a desire to supersede the past (224). Teresa M. Vilarós has termed the phenomenon the “pacto del olvido,” or the “pact of forgetting,” which enabled Spanish society to circumvent difficult and controversial questions about the legacy of Franquismo and enabled the government to quickly restore democratic freedom without internal conflicts (8-21).
The majority of the early initiatives of the Ministerio de Cultura focused on reinstating the freedom of expression denied by Franquismo and rectifying the injustices of the dictatorship with respect to the arts. As Chapter Four illustrates, Franquismo had imposed its own selective and oppressive form of cultural policy upon the nation; nearly forty years later however, Spain sought to present itself as an integrated part of both Europe and the rest of the world and turned to cultural policy as a means to do so. At the time, government officials believed that an alternative image of Spain could only be advanced and disseminated by a cohesive and expansive cultural policy and a sizeable and central government agency to plan and implement it (Moreno 225). The determinism of the Ministerio de Cultura, especially during the 1980s, fulfilled such a role through the sponsorship of numerous exhibitions, biennales, fairs, museums, and awards. In particular, the Ministerio de Cultura sought to support exhibitions on exiled artists and intellectuals, such as Miró (1978), Tàpies (1980), Chillida (1980), Picasso (1981), and Dalí (1983) among others (Moreno 226) (Fig. 17). In 1983, the resurgence of the Partido
Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE)—the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party—led to the formation of the Centro Nacional de Exposiciones (CNE) (National Center of Exhibitions) (Moreno 226). The CNE organized exhibitions on modern and contemporary art throughout the nation, although mainly in Madrid. It is striking to note that the CNE also outlined five criteria for the future development of exhibitions, including exhibitions related to Spanish history, *arte español* (Spanish art), contemporary art, special collections, and international biennales and fairs (Moreno 236). More importantly, the CNE pursued two interrelated goals—to recuperate history revised by *Franquismo* and to transform the cultural position of Spain throughout the world in the most rapid manner possible (Moreno 237). The CNE also organized the Feria Internacional de Arte Contemporáneo (International Fair of Contemporary Art), called ARCOmadrid today, as a means to reinsert Spain into the international dialogue on the arts (Moreno 237) (Fig. 18). The efforts undertaken by the CNE to cosmopolitanize the realm of cultural policy in Spain mirrored the widespread efforts to reassert Spanish sovereignty and democracy in the political and economic realms. However, the CNE not only directed its initiatives to the international community, but also internally to Spanish society. Moreno notes that, “since the democratic transition, an unusual number of visitors had attended exhibitions on contemporary art,” which could be perceived as a clear sign that Spanish society desired to be informed about the artistic movements of the time (240). The activities of the CNE and the Ministerio de Cultura during the 1980s reflected the aims of PSOE and, until 1983, the Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD) (Union of the Democratic Center) to bolster the involvement of the public sector in those areas that lacked support from the private sector.
From 1986 onward, the *Ministerio de Cultura* fast-tracked its goal to place Spain’s cultural policy at the forefront of the world. The *Ministerio de Cultura* aimed to construct world-class cultural institutions in Spain to rival those of the rest of Europe and the U.S. For example, the *Ministerio de Cultura* inaugurated the *Museo Nacional Centro de Arte Reina Sofía* (Reina Sofía Museum) in Madrid in April of 1986 (Fig. 19). The creation of the Reina Sofía Museum marked the first establishment of a museum of modern and contemporary art in Spain that attained an internationally recognized level—representative of the strategy employed by the *Ministerio de Cultura* to boost the cultural position of Spain throughout the world (*Museo Nacional Centro de Arte Reina Sofía*). During the same period, the *Ministerio de Cultura* also created the following institutions:
In addition to the above-mentioned milestones, Spain also hosted a number of international events, such as the Summer Olympic Games in Barcelona, the Universal Exposition of Seville, and the Fifth Centenary of the Discovery of America—all in 1992! Moreover, the transformation
of Spain’s cultural position culminated in 1992 with the designation of Madrid as the European Capital of Culture by the European Commission (European Commission). The activities of the Ministerio de Cultura throughout the 1980s and 1990s, as well as the numerous international events hosted by the nation, brought Spain to the forefront of the world from a cultural standpoint; the international community gradually came to recognize the confidence of Spain in the realm of cultural policy as it re-established itself in the international dialogue on the arts.

In many ways, the formative period described above greatly influenced the current structure of Spain’s cultural policy. As evidenced by the lengthy list above, the Ministerio de Cultura overextended its administrative and financial resources during the 1980s and 1990s in an attempt to capture the world’s attention. In effect, the Ministerio de Cultura undertook measures aimed at decentralization in order to transfer a bulk of responsibility to the autonomous governments of Spain’s seventeen regions and two autonomous cities. While the Constitution of 1978 enumerated the functions of the autonomous regions, or comunidades autónomas, in the arena of cultural policy, the Ministerio de Cultura nonetheless pioneered the majority of measures and accomplishments in the field (Villarroya 3-5). Following the intense activity by the Ministerio de Cultura during the mid-1990s (especially in 1992) the autonomous regions assumed greater responsibility in developing a cultural infrastructure and promoting cultural institutions. The subsequent naming of Spain’s European Capitals of Culture best evidences the process and result of decentralization—Santiago de Compostela in 2000 and Salamanca in 2002—both smaller cities than Madrid (European Commission, “Past European Capitals”). Although the Ministerio de Cultura reduced the number of its functions after the mid 1990s, it

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6 The European Capitals of Culture initiative was designed to highlight the richness and diversity of European cultures, celebrate the cultural ties that link Europeans together, bring people from different European countries into contact with each other’s culture and promote mutual understanding, and to foster a feeling of European citizenship.
has retained the exclusive responsibilities of protecting cultural property against export, creating legislation to protect copyright, and overseeing freedom of expression and creation and communication (Villarroya 7). The Ministerio de Cultura has also retained ownership of certain cultural institutions, including the Reina Sofía Museum, the Biblioteca Nacional (National Library), the Instituto Nacional de Artes Escénicas y de la Música (INAEM) (National Institute of the Performing Arts and Music), the Instituto Nacional de Cine y Artes Audiovisuales (INCAA) (National Institute of Cinematography and Audiovisual Artes), and the Museo del Prado (Ministerio de Educación, Cultura, y Deporte, “Museos”). The total number of museums under the control of the Ministerio de Cultura is twenty (Ministerio de Educación, Cultura, y Deporte, “Museos”). Moreover, the Ministerio de Cultura also governs archives, cultural cooperation and promotion abroad, cultural industries, infrastructure and equipment, books, reading, and literature, cultural patrimony, promotion of art, and intellectual property (Ministerio de Educación, Cultura, y Deporte).
Chapter 5B: Comparing Contemporary Cultural Policy: Spain and the United States

In many ways, the decentralization of cultural policy in Spain is distinct from that of the U.S. As elaborated in Chapter Three, the decentralization of the NEA to the SAAs and LAAs in the U.S. represented a strategy to effectively appease the “populist revolt” of the 1970s. On the other hand, decentralization by the Ministerio de Cultura to the comunidades autónomas in Spain reflects an effort to recognize and protect the linguistic and cultural diversity of the nation. The autonomous regions that averaged the greatest amount of public funding for the arts in 2010 include Catalonia at 22.2%, Andalusia at 14.3%, the Valencian Community at 9.8%, and the Basque Country at 7.8% (Council of Europe/ERICarts 63). All of the autonomous regions possess their own linguistic and cultural diversity in Spain and are resolute in protecting their heritage following the brutal suppression of such diversity by Franco throughout the dictatorship period. On another note, decentralization in the U.S. also serves as a means to escape total responsibility in decision-making about the arts: matching those who pay for the arts with those who benefit from the arts offers a viable solution to prevent inflammatory controversies on public funding for the arts. Such controversies are relatively rare in Spain, and in effect, decentralization operates as a means to better allocate administrative and financial resources rather than a political shuffle of accountability.

Today, the majority of public funding for the arts in Spain is by the autonomous regional and local governments rather than the Ministerio de Cultura. In total, regional and local governments provide nearly 85% of public funding for the arts—a statistic that reflects the extent to which decentralization has seeped into Spanish cultural policy (Council of Europe/ERICarts 62). While decentralization of Spanish public funding for the arts may appear surprising to those who assume that the Ministerio de Cultura is the sole government agency responsible for
promoting the arts, it is important to note that the latter continues to operate on a large and powerful platform, more so than the NEA. For example, although the per capita expenditure on the arts by the autonomous and local governments in 2010 amounted to 38.50 Euro and 87.9 Euro respectively, the Ministerio de Cultura also averaged approximately 22.8 Euro (Council of Europe/ERICarts 62). In the U.S., the per capita expenditure of the NEA in 2012 equaled $0.47 (Natl. Endowment for the Arts, “How the United States”). While the negligible level of per capita expenditure by the NEA is reflective of the U.S. emphasis on the private sector, it nevertheless reveals the disparity between the U.S. and Spain in administrative and financial capacity at the level of the central governments.

In terms of the type of funding, the Ministerio de Cultura directed approximately 50% of its total expenditure in 2010 to cultural heritage, which encompasses historical monuments, museums, archives, and libraries (Council of Europe/ERICarts 64). Of these subcategories, museums received the greatest share of the expenditure, or nearly 19.1% (Council of Europe/ERICarts 64). This may account for the fact that the Ministerio de Cultura is primarily responsible for the ownership and operation of certain cultural institutions. Although the visual arts received only 0.4% of the Ministerio de Cultura’s total expenditure, the category only includes spending on exhibitions (Council of Europe/ERICarts 64). Nevertheless, the Ministerio de Cultura, more so than the NEA, recognizes the value of supporting formal arts events that take place at cultural institutions. Similarly, the autonomous governments also directed approximately 37.3% of total expenditure in 2010 to cultural heritage (Council of Europe/ERICarts 65). However, 32.4% of total expenditure by the autonomous governments in 2010 also included the interdisciplinary category, which includes the subcategories of cultural promotion and cooperation, cultural dissemination abroad, general administration and services,
and language policy (Council of Europe/ERICarts 65-6). The latter reflects the priority of the autonomous governments in preserving their linguistic and cultural diversity. In general, the fact that both the Ministerio de Cultura and the autonomous governments apportion the greatest amount of total expenditure to cultural heritage reveals its symbolic value as a national and public asset, as well as its importance in the development of cultural tourism.

If one examines the Plan Estratégico General (Strategic General Plan) of the Ministerio de Cultura for 2012 to 2015, the guiding decision-making principles of the central government on the arts become clear. The Plan Estratégico General outlines five objectives of the Ministerio de Cultura and reflects the modifications undertaken by the central government agency in light of the global economic recession. The five stated objectives are listed below:

1. To articulate a state policy that guarantees the right of access to culture and contributes to the structure of citizenship and promotes social cohesion.

2. To strengthen, through transparency, instruments of communication and cultural cooperation between the public administrations and other institutions to promote an efficient and rational use of cultural resources.

3. To promote culture as an essential element in the exterior projection of the brand ESPAÑA.

4. To encourage the participation and involvement of civil society in supporting and promoting culture.

5. To facilitate the creation, innovation, and knowledge production and to promote culture on the Internet, while safeguarding the rights deriving from intellectual property (Secretaría de Estado de Cultura 13).

The Plan Estratégico General contains a separate and detailed list of strategies and projects that
pertain to each objective. While the first objective is a seemingly straightforward goal characteristic of any Ministry of Culture or the equivalent, one strategy by the Ministerio de Cultura to achieve it is quite interesting—Strategy 1.8 includes “facilitating access to the contemporary visual arts for all citizens” (Secretaría de Estado de Cultura 16). While expanding access to the arts is also a stated mission of the NEA, it does not specify creating access to the contemporary visual arts, and instead focuses on expanding the definition of the arts and culture to what may appear appropriate to public opinion at the time. On a similar note, Strategy 1.13 of the Plan Estratégico General “favors the creation and development of public performing arts and music, with special attention to the educational and social dimension” (Secretaría de Estado de Cultura 17). It is interesting to note that the Ministerio de Cultura openly promotes public art, as such a task is commonly designated to the SAAs, and primarily LAAs, in the U.S. The support of public art at the level of the central government is another indication of the general lack of controversy over public funding for the arts in Spain, as well as a greater degree of social cohesion. The second clause of Strategy 1.13 is a shared mission by both the NEA and the Ministerio de Cultura, and highlights the fact that Spanish cultural policy is similarly organized along didactic lines. Strategy 1.14 strikes a similar chord as the NEA on measuring the utility and economic practicality of the arts as it encourages “promoting the social and economic profitability of the activities and initiatives of the National Institute of the Performing Arts and Music” (Secretaría de Estado de Cultura 17). The second objective is indicative of the Ministerio de Cultura’s efforts to minimize unnecessary or wasteful expenditure and to improve the decentralized relationship between itself and the autonomous governments. It is important to note that the objective does not call for further decentralization—quite the contrary. Since the election of Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy and the center-right to right-wing Partido Popular
(PP) (People’s Party), the central government has exhibited a re-centralizing tendency and imposed discerning and restrictive policies on spending by the autonomous governments as well—the politics of public funding for the arts in Spain will be discussed in detail a later section. The third objective is perhaps the most indicative of the stance on culture adopted by the *Ministerio de Cultura* since the global economic recession. On the one hand, the *Ministerio de Cultura* is capitalizing on Spain’s association with culture in the collective imaginary of tourists by boldly declaring that “España es cultura,” or “Spain is culture” and marketing this sentiment abroad. The third objective entails a number of strategies that range from promoting cultural tourism to internationalizing Spain’s cultural industries (Secretaría de Estado de Cultura 64). Many of the strategies display an effort by the *Ministerio de Cultura* to not only protect Spanish cultural heritage, but also support a fervent defense and promotion of Spanish nationalism—perhaps inspired by *Partido Popular’s* conservative stance. For example, Strategy 3.5 includes “furthering the initiatives for cultural heritage protection in Europe” (Secretaría de Estado de Cultura 64). Similarly, Strategy 3.4 calls for “strengthening the international protection of cultural heritage in the arena of the UNESCO Convention,” while Strategy 3.8 seeks to “encourage the international protection and knowledge of the sources of shared history between Spain and Latin America, Europe, and the other nations of the Mediterranean” (Secretaría de Estado de Cultura 64). Finally, Strategy 3.7 of the *Plan Estratégico General* advocates “supporting the international protection of the sector of Spanish visual arts” (Secretaría de Estado de Cultura 64). In many ways, the strategies described above strive to sustain the competitiveness of Spain in the realm of cultural policy and cultural tourism, especially as traditionally peripheral centers of the world, such as Brazil, India, and China among others, are fiercely encroaching on and diverting attention from Western and European artistic centers of the
world. In addition, the strategies are also aimed at maintaining the relevance of Spain throughout Europe and the rest of the world, especially as many Spaniards believe that Spanish sovereignty has been undermined by the harsh austerity measures imposed upon the nation by the leading member states of the European Union.

The global economic recession coerced Spain into reducing the budget of the *Ministerio de Cultura* by approximately 25% in 2010, 14% in 2011, and 15% in 2012 (Council of Europe/ERICarts 64). Although the cuts are gradually declining, Spain continues to endure severe austerity measures that threaten the future of *patrocinio de las artes*. In a recent *New York Times* article, “Now Onstage in Spain: Austerity,” Zachary Woolfe anecdotally illustrates the effects of the austerity measures on both small and large-scale cultural institutions throughout Spain. For example, Woolfe claims that the cuts have prompted the *Museo del Prado* in Madrid to cancel a retrospective on Lucian Freud as well as other exhibitions (“Now Onstage”). The austerity measures have also deeply crippled several small-scale cultural institutions, including La Poderosa, an experimental dance and performance space in Barcelona that suffered the loss of nearly $90,000 in funding from central and regional governments during the past year (Woolfe). The *Ministerio de Cultura* found that since 2009, the average cultural institution reduced its budget or volume of activity by nearly 49.8% (Woolfe). If the downward trend continues, it is expected that Spanish artists and cultural institutions will abandon Spain in favor of viable arts capitals throughout the rest of Europe and the world. The strict austerity measures have temporarily immobilized the *Ministerio de Cultura*, which has limited its scope to sustaining the normal operation of cultural institutions that support cultural tourism and to tapping resources from channels other than the central government. In a related article, “In Europe, Where Art Is Life, Ax Falls on Public Financing,” Larry Rohter suggests that many cultural institutions in
Europe, inclusive of those based in Spain, are increasingly turning to the private sector—*in the U.S.*—for contributions. Rohter notes that support from the private sector for the arts is to a large degree underdeveloped in Europe in comparison to the U.S. Therefore, cultural institutions in Europe are effectively competing over private sector donations with other resource-stressed cultural institutions in the U.S. (Rohter). While there is an element of truth in the argument laid forth by Rohter, it is also crucial to explore the efforts led by the central governments of Spain and Europe to incorporate each country’s private sector into the model of public funding for the arts.


The fourth objective of the *Plan Estratégico General* reflects the aim of the *Ministerio de Cultura* to adopt a model of public funding for the arts similar to that of the U.S. The fourth objective seeks to “encourage the participation and involvement of civil society in supporting and promoting culture” and is representative of *Partido Popular’s* stance on bolstering privatization in Spain. For example, Strategy 4.3 intends to “encourage initiatives for private financing, especially in regard to sponsorship and institutional patronage in sector of the visual
In a speech at the *Museo del Prado* on January 29, 2013, Rajoy reinforced the significance of cultural policy as something to which “any government deserving respect pays full attention” (La Moncloa) (Fig. 20). However, Rajoy also stressed that in order “to develop the full potential of our artists,” the central government must involve the private sector (La Moncloa). Rajoy and *Partido Popular* insist that including the private sector into the framework of support for the arts will not only protect the latter from being reduced to “what the public budget will allow,” but also encourage greater participation by all levels of society, from the citizen to the corporation (La Moncloa). Rajoy and *Partido Popular* have demonstrated eagerness and resolve in balancing the budget of Spain by drastically scaling back on spending by the central government. Whereas privatization also functions as a means to reduce the symbolic stake of the central government in the arts in the U.S., in Spain, the incentive of *Partido Popular* to court the private sector is more aligned with fiscal conservatism. Rajoy will modify legislation from 2002, the so-called *Ley de Mecenazgo* (Law of Sponsorship), by increasing tax exemptions for generous investments in the realm of culture. The current legislation allows for individuals to receive a tax exemption of up to 25% on income tax for the total amount contributed to cultural institutions, and in the case of corporations, a tax return of up to 35% (Verdú). While certain donations to cultural institutions in the U.S. are often 100% tax exempt, Rajoy is only aiming to introduce a tax exemption between 60% and 70%—the current tax exemption rates employed by France and the United Kingdom (Verdú).

Given the dire financial straits of the central government and the broader shift from the left to the center-right represented by the election of *Partido Popular*, the *Ley de Mecenazgo* has proven less controversial than it might under different economic and political circumstances. For example, a recent *El País* article praised the successes of the *Museo del Prado* in increasing the
amount of contributions it receives from the private sector (Seisdedos). Although the *Museo del Prado* primarily raised contributions through museum admission fees, it also added a number of sponsors from the private sector (Seisdedos) (Fig. 21). While such a strategy may prove successful for large-scale cultural institutions and those under the ownership of the central government, it is unlikely to be as effective for small-scale institutions such as La Poderosa, which is lacking in both financial and administrative resources and outreach when compared to the *Museo del Prado*. Moreover, the *Ley de Mecenazgo* may indirectly foster the production of so-called “blockbuster” exhibitions that feature a high-profile artist or artistic movement and are mainly staged to attract a larger audience. In sum, although the *Ley de Mecenazgo* is the hallmark of the *Plan Estratégico General* and Rajoy’s vision for the privatization of the arts has been welcomed in light of Spain’s volatile economy, the legislation also poses a set of challenges in terms of which cultural institutions will be able to stay afloat and what type of art will be supported.

Conclusion

It cannot be denied that the global economic recession had devastating consequences for the arts. Artists faced skyrocketing unemployment and numerous cultural institutions were either forced to close down or scale-back operations in both the U.S. and Spain. The distressing economic and political circumstances undoubtedly posed negative implications for public funding for the arts in the U.S. and Spain, as both the NEA and the Ministerio de Cultura have experienced drastic shortcomings in their financial and administrative capacities. However, while other nations, such as Portugal, suffered the temporary elimination of its Ministry of Culture—the U.S. and Spain have attempted to avoid such pitfalls by reinforcing the economic practicality of the arts. The blunt impact of the global economic recession on the arts necessitated both compromise and creativity in devising strategies to promote the arts during a period of financial hardship, especially since expenditure for the arts can be viewed as superfluous. Examination of the NEA’s Appropriations Request for Fiscal Year 2013 and the Ministerio de Cultura’s equivalent Plan Estratégico General makes clear that both nations have embarked on a similar path to reduce the dependence of the arts on the central government, to ensure the self-sustainability of cultural institutions, and to situate the arts in an ongoing dialogue on the potential of creative industries to generate revenue and employment.

The historical evolution of public funding for the arts in the U.S. and Spain traced in Chapters One and Four, demonstrates that the U.S. gradually adopted an arms-length and utilitarian approach to supporting the arts over time, as the NEA continually found itself at the crux of a “populist revolt” or defending the mere principle of federal government intervention in the arts. Moreover, the general lack of consensus about the role and value of the arts in society and a political will to match those who benefit from the arts with those who pay for the arts
speaks to the marginal scope of the NEA in comparison to the Ministerio de Cultura. In other words, the recent emphasis by the NEA, as well as SAAs and LAAs, on further privatization of the arts does not come as a surprise. On the other hand, public funding for the arts in Spain evokes a historical narrative rooted in national patrimony and, more recently, rectifying Franco’s suppression of the freedom of expression. In Spain, the development of an extensive cultural policy focused on sponsoring “no-strings-attached” artistic creation and supporting the arts as a crucial and intrinsically beneficial element of society represents the norm. While the effects of the global economic recession have gradually receded (although not entirely) in the U.S., Spain continues to endure a series of harsh austerity measures implemented by Rajoy and Partido Popular, as well as the European Union. The effect of the global economic recession on the cultural policy of Spain is unprecedented, as the Ministerio de Cultura’s goal to privatize the arts does come as a surprise to many. In sum, while the privatization of the arts is a “tried-and-true” formula in the U.S., it remains to be tested in Spain.

As mentioned in Chapters Four and Five, a topic of increasing importance for the near future is the mounting influence of traditionally-“periphery” nations in the arts. Whereas the U.S. and Spain (and Europe)—“the West”—is often recognized as the “art capital” of the world, economic and political shifts are inciting the rapid dissolution of the singular “art capital” in favor of multiple “art capitals” across the globe. In other words, the arts no longer subscribe to a “center.” While the U.S. and Spain are leaning towards a strict rationalization and trimming-down of cultural policy, such as downsizing the NEA and the Ministerio de Cultura, emerging nations, including India, China, and Brazil among others, are promoting the opposite. The developing nations have demonstrated eagerness and prowess in attracting artists and developing cultural infrastructures through the creation of cultural institutions, participation in biennales,
and the hosting of art fairs. In many ways, the U.S. and Spain face the same challenge of eroding competitiveness in an evolving landscape of cultural policy. Although Spain is engaging in an experiment with the Ley de Mecenazgo by paralleling the model of public funding for the arts employed by the U.S., it remains to be seen whether both nations ought to draw upon cultural policy frameworks being developed in India, China, or Brazil. Despite the draining effects of the global economic recession, it is likely that cultural policy will once again be elevated as a cornerstone of democracy and national identity—for better or for worse—as impending geopolitical shifts occur and translate to the realm of the arts.
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